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When should a civilian seller of goods who delays delivery or cancels
altogether under a wartime contract be able to claim excuse under U.C.C.
Article 2? The unprecedented extent of the U.S. military’s use of
contractors abroad calls for a rethinking of U.C.C. impracticability, as
private parties face wartime risks once encountered solely by the
government. The traditional approach typically denies the seller the right
to excuse the failure of delivery in instances where the wartime risk might
be categorized as foreseeable or is expressly or impliedly allocated to the
seller. This analysis forces a dilemma upon the seller facing threats of
serious injury or death. At the same time, the civilian seller typically does
not enjoy the same privileges regarding use of force that government
provisioners once exercised. This Article proposes a new paradigm—one
that would hold sellers to deliver goods in most circumstances, but would
make excuse available to sellers through an analysis of functions that are
inherently governmental. This analysis grants excuse where the risks
associated with wartime contingencies requiring a military response are
inherently governmental and, therefore, remain with the government. The
rationale balances the interests of civilians performing wartime contracts
and the military’s need for goods and control of the wartime theater that
would warrant excusing contractors during wartime from performance in
cases of extreme hazard to a contractor’s employees.
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1. L. PAUL BREMER III WITH MALCOLM MCCONNELL, MY YEAR IN IRAQ: THE STRUGGLE
TO BUILD A FUTURE OF HOPE 26 (2006).
2. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
3. See, e.g., David Jackson & Tom Vanden Brook, Experts Weigh in on Bush’s Assertions,
USA TODAY, Apr. 4, 2007, at 7A (discussing funding proposals by President Bush); David Rohde
& David E. Sanger, How the ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007,
at A1 (comparing amounts spent in Iraq and Afghanistan); Editorial, The House Speaks; Next Step:
Cut Off Funding for the War in Iraq, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 20, 2007, at B6 (discussing
funding controversy in Congress).
4. T. CHRISTIAN MILLER, BLOOD MONEY: WASTED BILLIONS, LOST LIVES, AND CORPORATE
GREED IN IRAQ xiv–xvi (2006).
5. JENNIFER K. ELSEA & NINA M. SERAFINO, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., PRIVATE
SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ: BACKGROUND, LEGAL STATUS, AND OTHER ISSUES 3–4 (2007),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32419.pdf.
6. See MILLER, supra note 4, at 165.
7. See id.
I.  INTRODUCTION
“[I]t’s not that we didn’t plan. The problem is that we planned for the
wrong contingency.”
—Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III1
On September 18, 2001, Congress granted President Bush the
“authori[ty] to use all necessary and appropriate force” to combat
terrorism in the Middle East.  His use of this authority has increased the2
government’s need to contract for goods and services overseas.
Consequently, Congress has approved billions of American dollars for the
war and reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan, leading to billions
of dollars in contracts.  The U.S. government and the Iraqi provisional3
authorities approved wartime and rebuilding contracts in the tens of
billions of dollars to companies such as Halliburton, Bechtel Corporation,
Fluor Corporation, Washington Group International, Inc., Perini
Corporation, Parsons Corporation, and Lucent Technologies, Inc.4
According to a recent report, more than 182,000 people are employed in
Iraq under contracts with the U.S. Government.5
Many of these wartime contractors have faced obstacles while
providing contracted goods and services in Iraq and Afghanistan due to
dangerous conditions created by insurgents. Other contractors have faced
obstacles due to dangerous conditions when providing contracted goods
in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Placing civilian contractors in war zones has led6
not only to difficulty in contract performance, but also to injury and death
of contractors’ employees.  In response, some contractors have delayed7
3
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8. Id. at 161.
9. MILLER, supra note 4, at 132, 148; see also J.T. Mlinarcik, Note, Private Military
Contractors & Justice: A Look at the Industry, Blackwater, & the Fallujah Incident, 4 REGENT J.
INT’L L. 129, 138–47 (2006) (discussing the legal and practical difficulties under U.S., Iraqi and
international law related to finding and punishing those responsible for killing contractors in Iraq);
David Ivanovich & Brett Clanton, Contractor Deaths in Iraq Nearing 800; Toll Has Surged in Past
Months, But Civilians Still Line Up for the Jobs, HOUS. CHRON., Jan. 28, 2007, at A1 (discussing
deaths and injuries of KBR personnel in Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan). For a discussion of the
litigation against Halliburton and KBR arising out of the April 2004 attack, see Lane v. Halliburton,
529 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2008) and infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
10. See OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, SIGIR-08-002,
LOGISTICS CIVIL AUGMENTATION PROGRAM TASK ORDERS 130 AND 151: PROGRAM MANAGEMENT,
REIMBURSEMENT, AND TRANSITION, at i, 1 (2007), available at http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/
audits/08-002.pdf (listing types of services and noting as of March 4, 2007 the total cost of all task
orders issued under the contract was approximately $22.5 billion). The contract is a cost-plus award
fee contract, giving the contractor financial incentives based on performance, and does not contain
a dollar ceiling amount. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-854, MILITARY
OPERATIONS: DOD’S EXTENSIVE USE OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONTRACTS REQUIRES
STRENGTHENED OVERSIGHT 7–8 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04854.pdf.
A copy of the original contract is accessible through various online sources. See, e.g., Kellogg
Brown & Root Award Contract (Dec. 14, 2001), http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/LOG
CAP.pdf. 
11. MILLER, supra note 4, at 162. 
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also BREMER, supra note 1, at 342.
14. U.C.C. § 2-615 (2003). By its terms, Article 2 only applies to the sale of goods. U.C.C.
§ 2-102. That said, courts have applied by analogy U.C.C. § 2-615 to cases beyond the scope of
Article 2. See, e.g., Asphalt Int’l, Inc. v. Enter. Shipping Corp., 667 F.2d 261, 265–66 (2d Cir.
1981) (applying § 2-615 principles to issues involving repair of a chartered vessel); Transatlantic
Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 314–15 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (using § 2-615 principles in case
of a chartered vessel during the Suez Canal closure).
performance, or ceased performance altogether.  For example, insurgents8
attacked a Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) convoy of nineteen trucks
delivering fuel, resulting in the death of six drivers and the loss of two-
thirds of the fuel trucks.  KBR had been working in Iraq to provide food,9
fuel, and other items under contracts worth about $22.3 billion.  After the10
2004 attack, KBR ceased performance under its contract for about two
weeks, leaving the military and government representatives in Iraq without
food and water.  The military forces faced immediate problems and had11
to ration food and eat prepackaged MREs.  Paul Bremer, head of the12
Coalition Provisional Authority, even considered food rationing for the
CPA staff.  KBR is not alone.13
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code includes a framework
governing breaches by sellers and excuse in contracts for the sale of
goods.  Despite the general utility of Article 2’s default provisions, which14
may also apply as a backup rule system for government contracts, there is
no satisfactory guidance for applying § 2-615 excuse to wartime contracts
4
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15. See Federal Acquisition Regulation, Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses, 48
C.F.R. § 52.249-14 (2008); see also Defense Acquisition Regulations System, Department of
Defense, Solicitation Provisions and Contract Clauses, 48 C.F.R. § 252.217-7009. The regulations
allow the government to terminate contracts, but excuse default by the contractor where the causes
are: “(1) acts of God or of the public enemy, (2) acts of the Government in either its sovereign or
contractual capacity, (3) fires, (4) floods, (5) epidemics, (6) quarantine restrictions, (7) strikes,
(8) freight embargoes, and (9) unusually severe weather.” 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-14. Whether a failure
is the result of one of the stated causes is determined by the government contracting officer. Id.
16. See 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040 (2008). This provision observes that performance may be
dangerous and that civilian contractors accept the risk of performance under such conditions. Id.
The provision further recognizes that the contractors are civilians and are limited in their ability to
use deadly force. Id.; see also Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Contractor
Personnel Supporting a Force Deployed Outside the United States, 70 Fed. Reg. 23,790, 23,792
(May 5, 2005) (codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 207, 212, 225, 252) (discussing comments and subsequent
amendments to the proposed language of the rule that adequately reflect the amount of risk the
regulation should shift to the contractors). For a discussion of the working of defense provisions
and policy, see infra Part II.B.
17. See MILLER, supra note 4, at 161–62.
18. U.C.C. § 2-615(a) & cmt. 1. Although common law permits excuse in response to
impossibility and frustration of purpose, Article 2 allows excuse on an arguably broader ground
when “failure of presupposed conditions” creates an impracticability. Id.
where exceptionally harsh conditions arise, such as where the seller is
faced with a serious risk of personal injury or death to its employees if it
continues to perform. In some circumstances, the Federal Acquisition
Regulations will shield government contractors from default under its
excusable delay.  However, other required contract clauses state that15
contractors accept at least some of the risk associated with contract
performance in dangerous conditions when deployed outside the United
States.  Civilian contractors’ limited ability to fully excuse performance16
under these provisions for wartime sales is troublesome when the
contingency for the claimed excuse arises because of wartime conditions.
Yet, practice suggests that government contractors have cancelled or
delayed delivery under wartime contracts in some cases, even where the
military is faced with shortage of supplies.17
“[U]nforeseen supervening circumstances not within the contemplation
of the parties at the time of contracting” excuse an Article 2 seller from
timely delivery of goods under the doctrine of impracticability and cut off
a buyer’s right to claim breach.  In the case of wartime contracts where18
extreme personal hazard is a risk, a narrow interpretation of the unforeseen
circumstances test may prove unsatisfying for the seller. Yet, if the
military goes without needed hardware and supplies, the wartime effort
may be compromised. If excuse under § 2-615 is unavailable, what other
options are available to the seller? How can the government be truly
assured that the military will be properly supplied without having its own
personnel ensure all deliveries? Can a government buyer resort to Article
5
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2 remedies after a seller breaches by failing to deliver goods for the
wartime effort? This remains a significant issue. Indeed, a broad definition
of excuse would deny the government access to Article 2 remedies and
leave the government with little certainty that sellers will deliver under
wartime contracts.
This Article analyzes a civilian seller’s right to claim excuse from a
wartime contract and suggests an approach that balances the seller’s risk
due to wartime hazards, including extreme personal hazard, against the
government’s need to have military supplies. Considering the KBR
situation as one of the challenges facing contractors and the government,
this Article describes the typical approach to the excuse question, which
focuses on increased costs associated with performance. Next, this Article
explores existing law and scholarly commentary concerning claims of
impracticability by non-delivering sellers. I conclude that none of the
existing impracticability analyses satisfactorily balance the needs of the
civilian seller and the government during wartime where the seller is faced
with extreme wartime risks, such as extreme personal hazard.
Instead, I suggest a solution which revisits the demarcation between
contractor-assumed risks and government-retained risks of warfare, and
involves a novel application of the doctrine of impracticability. The
solution uses an analysis of inherently governmental functions to excuse
seller performance in extreme wartime conditions where performance
would require the seller to perform an inherently governmental function,
including tasks contracted out to other companies. Inherently
governmental functions are those so intimately related to the public
interest as to require performance by federal government employees,
according to the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998. This
theory posits that in certain circumstances the government retains the risk
of inherently governmental functions it has expressly or impliedly
outsourced. This approach provides sellers a limited right to excuse
performance in a manner that is consistent with the underlying principles
of Article 2 and general contract law. Though novel, the solution draws
from existing doctrines regarding impracticability and inherently
governmental functions. This approach honors the ideal of binding parties
to their agreements, while accounting for current challenges in wartime
procurement. The result is a conceptually sound application of the excuse
doctrine that holds sellers to their bargains in most circumstances. I
conclude with a proposal of the specific balancing of interests needed in
wartime procurements relative to performance and breach under Article 2.
6
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19. See supra notes 7–13 and accompanying text.
20. See World Fuel Services (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. Contract § 2 (Apr. 3, 2002),
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/world_fuel_services.pdf.
21. Id. § 13.
22. World Fuel Services (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. Delivery Conditions § 6,
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/world_fuel_services.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2008).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. World Fuel Services (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. Amendment of Solicitation/Modification




II.  THE PROBLEM OF WARTIME CONTRACTS
A.  The Contractor Dilemma
Wartime contractors face the challenge of performance under harsh and
changing circumstances that present risk of extreme personal hazard to
employees. The KBR scenario after the 2004 attack typifies one contractor
performance issue the contractor faced: not only destruction of most of the
goods, but also loss of life and injury to employees delivering the goods.19
After this attack, performance of the contract presented KBR with a case
of “extreme” personal hazard on the continuum of contractor performance
issues.
The U.S. wartime contract with World Fuel Services Pte., Ltd. (WFS)
represents another typical spot on the continuum of the contractor
performance issue—one of “partial” personal hazards. In 2002, WFS
contracted to supply jet fuel for U.S. aircraft operating from military bases
in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The contract authorized WFS to arrange for20
transportation of fuel to the destination, rather than deliver the fuel itself.21
At the outset, the parties highlighted the problems along the
Pakistani/Afghan border and the need to drive primarily during the day
due to security concerns.  While the parties recognized the need for WFS22
to closely coordinate truck movements,  they incorrectly anticipated that23
unforeseen delays would lessen as WFS established a delivery routine.24
Instead, WFS faced difficulties and increased costs in the delivery of
the fuel under the contract due to threats of violence against the truck
drivers.  Specifically, WFS’s problems included damage to and theft of25
trucks, threats to and arrests of truck drivers, and risk of strikes by
drivers.  Consequently, WFS and the government agreed in April 2003 to26
a $100,000 increase in the cost of transportation.  Since WFS and the27
government reached a solution, it remains unclear whether WFS would be
entitled to recover the increase in cost under federal regulations or U.C.C.
7
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28. 48 C.F.R. § 52.252-2 (2008); see Robert Nichols & Steve Phillips, Private Suppliers in
a Public Role: Helping the U.S. Military in Iraq and Elsewhere, 14 BUS. L. TODAY, July–Aug.
2005, at 13, 14 (stating that federal regulatory rules impose more requirements than a typical
commercial contract).
29. See Kellogg Brown & Root Award Contract (Dec. 14, 2001), http://projects.public
integrity.org/docs/wow/LOGCAP.pdf. 
30. See World Fuel Services (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. Contract § 2 (Apr. 3, 2002),
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/world_fuel_services.pdf.
31. Although different provisions apply depending on whether the contract is one for cost-
reimbursement or fixed price supply and service or a commercial items contract, the
excusable-delay provisions require the same elements. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-8 (addressing fixed
price supply and service contracts); 48 C.F.R § 52.249-14 (addressing various types of contracts
such as those for supplies, services, construction, time-and-material contracts and labor-hour
contracts); 48 C.F.R. § 52.212-4 (2008) (addressing contracts for commercial items). For a good
overview of the use of excusable delay in government contracts generally, see NEIL H. O’DONNELL
& PATRICIA A. MEAGHER, TERMINATIONS OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS IV.A (2007) (arguing that
the excusable delay provision is more liberal than the U.C.C.).
excuse doctrine. Had WFS needed to excuse or delay its performance
under the jet fuel contract, both the foreseeability of the violence and the
possibility that the risk of violence was allocated to contractors like WFS
who receive a premium for wartime deliveries would present impediments
to WFS’ argument. The need of the military to receive critical supplies like
jet fuel suggests that civilian contractors like WFS should nearly always
be held to their deals.
B.  Unraveling the Web of Defense Regulations and Policy
Evaluation of whether either contractor on this continuum is able to
delay or excuse performance during wartime depends in part on the terms
of the agreements made with the government. These agreements rest
primarily on contract language and policies set by the federal government
and the Department of Defense (DoD). As part of the solicitation and
contract practice of the federal government, contract documents provide
that the entire body of purchasing practices and mandatory contract clauses
contained in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FARs), the DoD FAR
Supplement (DFARS), and the command unique clauses are automatically
incorporated into any agreement.  As such, a default rule system applies28
to government contracting—even in wartime—rather than a system with
individualized negotiation of substantive clauses. Both the KBR  and29
WFS  contracts reflect this practice.30
The standard excusable-delay provisions incorporated in the KBR and
WFS contracts give the contractor a right to cease performance without
governmental recourse for damages if the contractor does not perform due
to the acts of a public enemy,  a category that would seem to include the31
8
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32. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.249-8(c), (g), 52.249-14(a), 52.212-4(f) (2008). The FARs require
as a matter of policy the inclusion of an excusable delay clause. See 48 C.F.R. § 49.505 (2008). In
the event that excusable delay is found and the government terminates the contract, such
termination is deemed to be “for the convenience of the Government.” 48 C.F.R. § 49.401.
33. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.212-4(f), 52.249-8(c), 52.249-14(a); see also United States v.
Brooks-Callaway Co., 318 U.S. 120, 122–24 (1943) (finding that contractor could not claim excuse
for event it could foresee); Hardeman-Monier-Hutcherson, 67-1 B.C.A (CCH) ¶ 6,158, A.S.B.C.A.
No. 10444 (Armed Servs. Bd. of Contract Appeals, Feb. 17, 1967) (appeal) (quoting exculpatory
clause in contract); Marine Transp. Lines, Inc., 86-3 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 19,164, A.S.B.C.A. No.
28962 (Armed Servs. Bd. of Contract Appeals, July 9, 1986) (appeal) (quoting exculpatory clause
in contract but concluding that the contractor was not entitled to delays due to weather conditions).
Foreseeability seems not to be a separate requirement under the FARs for sales of goods. See
O’DONNELL & MEAGHER, supra note 31, at IV.A.4.
34. 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.212-4, 52.249-8, 52.249-14. The contractor has the burden of proving
the basis for excuse. See Double B Enters., Inc., 01-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 31,396, A.S.B.C.A. Nos.
52010, 52192 (Armed Servs. Bd. of Contract Appeals, Apr. 24, 2001) (appeals); FDL Techs., Inc.,
93-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 25,518, A.S.B.C.A. No. 41515 (Armed Servs. Bd. of Contract Appeals, Sept.
30, 1992) (appeal).
35. 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-14; see also De Armas v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 605, 606–07 (Ct.
Cl. 1947) (finding that the contractor was entitled to extension of time for completion of the
contract due to unforeseeable weather conditions); Keith Crawford & Assocs., 95-1 B.C.A. (CCH)
¶ 27,388, A.S.B.C.A. No. 46893 (Armed Servs. Bd. of Contract Appeals, Dec. 20, 1994) (appeal)
(noting that default termination of the contract by the government should be overturned if the
contractor’s failure to perform was due to excusable causes).
36. See Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Contractor Personnel
Supporting a Force Deployed Outside the United States, 70 Fed. Reg. 23,790, 23,792 (May 5, 2005)
(codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 207, 212, 225, 252); see also JOINT CONTRACTING
COMMAND—IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN, CONTRACTING OFFICER’S GUIDE TO SPECIAL CONTRACT
REQUIREMENTS FOR IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN THEATER BUSINESS CLEARANCE 17–20, 22 (2007)
(implementing new regulation 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040).
insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.  The regulatory provisions also32
require that any excuse claimed by KBR or WFS must be both beyond the
control and without fault or negligence of the contractor.  Additionally,33
contractors like KBR and WFS are required to request excuse, and the
contracting officer must evaluate the extent of the problem.  If the34
contracting officer determines that the failure to deliver or request for
delay is justified, then either the delivery schedule is revised or the
contract is terminated.35
Both the KBR and WFS contracts, though, involved sellers providing
goods that support the military efforts in the Middle East—arrangements
that increase the potential for action by public enemies. To address these
issues relating to contract performance outside the United States during
wartime, the government added a new, mandatory contract clause effective
June 6, 2005.  The regulations in 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040 requires36
inclusion of a contract clause for military contractors recognizing both that
contractors are civilians, and that the contract may require performance “in
9
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37. 48 C.F.R § 252.225-7040(b) (2008). The provisions place limitations on the ability of
contractors to use force. Id. Limitations on the use of force are certainly consistent with United
States obligations under the United Nations Charter, which prohibits the use of force excepting
cases of self-defense, or as authorized by the United Nations Security Council. U.N. Charter art.
2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”).
38. 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040(b)(2).
39. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Contractor Personnel Supporting
a Force Deployed Outside the United States, 70 Fed. Reg. at 23,792.
40. Id. The implementing regulations for the Federal Activities Inventory Reform (FAIR) Act
state that an inherently governmental function “is one that is so intimately related to the exercise
of the public interest as to mandate performance by Federal employees.” Implementation of the
Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (FAIR Act), Pub. Law No. 105-270, 64 Fed. Reg.
33,927, 33,929 (June 24, 1999). This typically would “include those activities which require either
the exercise of discretion in applying Government authority or the use of value judgment in making
decisions for the Government.” Id. at 33,931; accord 48 C.F.R. § 7.503 (2008) (providing a
non-exclusive list of examples of inherently governmental functions). With respect to the military,
these functions would include “activities performed exclusively by military personnel who are
subject to deployment in a combat, combat support or combat service support role.” FAIR Act, 60
Fed. Reg. at 33,931; see also Michael J. Davidson, Ruck Up: An Introduction to the Legal Issues
Associated with Civilian Contractors on the Battlefield, 29 PUB. CONT. L.J. 233, 256–58 (2000)
(discussing inherently governmental functions in the context of the armed forces).
dangerous or austere conditions.”  The provision further states that37
contractors “accept[] the risk” of performance in such conditions.  The38
intent of this provision is not to change prior law or regulations on
excusable delay, but rather to ensure that contractors will assume
responsibility for their own employees, and adequately supervise and train
them “in as safe a mode as possible.”  The government, however,39
arguably retains all “risk associated with inherently Governmental
functions.”  Because this general backdrop of regulation clarifies40
somewhat the government’s right to enforce wartime contracts and the
seller’s rights and obligations in the face of extreme personal hazard,
impracticability and interpretation doctrines may be useful to guide the
government and companies like KBR and WFS.
C.  Excusing Wartime Sellers under the Traditional Impracticability
Doctrine
In a typical dispute over performance, the government will claim
breach for the seller’s failure to deliver the goods. In response, the
contractor will usually claim excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615 and that the
government is not entitled to damages because unforeseen wartime
circumstances caused the problem. Specifically, the contractor would
argue that it was ready and otherwise able to perform the contract, but
increased insurgent activity created a contingency whereby performance
10
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41. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting
that the three elements of commercial impracticability generally are: (1) that a contingency
occurred; (2) that risk of unexpected occurrence had not been allocated; and (3) that occurrence of
contingency rendered performance commercially impracticable). The general rules of contract law
apply equally to government contracts. Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc. v. United
States, 530 U.S. 604, 607–08 (2000) (“‘When the United States enters into contract relations, its
rights and duties therein are governed generally by the law applicable to contracts between private
individuals.’” (quoting United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996))). 
42. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 90-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 22,602, A.S.B.C.A. No. 32323 (Armed
Servs. Bd. of Contract Appeals, Dec. 29, 1989) (appeal).
43. Id. (noting that the contractor did not argue commercial impossibility or impracticability
based on increased costs but instead that performance became impracticable due to “absolute unsafe
conditions” due to threat of hostilities in Persian Gulf).
44. See U.C.C. § 2-615(c) (2003) (requiring notification of buyer by seller regarding delay
or failure to deliver).
45. Id. § 2-615(a).
46. Id. (positing that no breach occurs where performance is impracticable).
47. Id. § 2-709.
48. See id. § 2-615 cmt. 4.
49. For instance, factual issues would include whether the non-occurrence of insurgent
activity here was a “basic assumption” under U.C.C. § 2-615(a), whether the contract allocated the
risk differently, and whether the contractor gave proper notice to the government under U.C.C.
§ 2-615(c). Id. § 2-615.
raised risk of extreme personal hazard to employees delivering the goods.41
The contractor would further contend that the changing nature of wartime
hazards was not allocated to it by custom or by the agreement—or
alternately that the risk is allocated to the government.  The contractor42
would also assert that the increased insurgent activity rendered delivery of
the goods commercially impracticable because the cost of overcoming the
extreme personal hazard to its employees would include not only increased
financial costs of an unknown magnitude, but also loss of life or serious
injury to personnel.  The contractor would also note that it gave the43
government notice of the delay or non-delivery within a reasonable time
after the ground situation changed and the extent to which delivery may
still be possible.  Because of this commercial impracticability, the44
contractor will argue that it did not breach the contract under U.C.C.
§ 2-615.  Therefore, the contractor will assert the government is not45
entitled to the normal U.C.C. remedies for breach of contract requiring
delivery of the goods,  and that under U.C.C. § 2-709, it is entitled to46
payment for any goods that  were actually delivered.47
If KBR or WFS were faced with an unforeseen severe shortage of
goods due to the war in the Middle East, the contractors would have a
good chance of succeeding in a claim for excuse.  While factual issues48
would have to be resolved,  KBR and WFS have a strong case that49
performance became impracticable due to excessive and unreasonable
financial costs of performance. Because the contingencies involve risk of
11
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50. See Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318–19 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
51. See U.C.C. § 2-615 (making § 2-615 not applicable where seller had assumed greater
obligations under the contract); see, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp., 72-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 9,186,
A.S.B.C.A. No. 13341 (Armed Servs. Bd. of Contract Appeals, Nov. 19, 1971) (appeal) (noting that
any shifting of risk of increased cost to the contractor should be clearly stated in the contract);
Aerosonic Instrument Corp., 59-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 2,115, A.S.B.C.A. No. 4129 (Armed Servs. Bd.
of Contract Appeals, Mar. 12, 1959) (appeal) (finding that obvious risks are assumed by contractor,
such as when contractor undertakes to provide research and development for an item that had never
been manufactured before).
52. 48 C.F.R. § 52.212-4(f) (2008) (requiring the contractor to give detailed written
notification of all circumstances related to the delay and when they cease to exist). 
53. U.C.C. § 2-615.
54. See, e.g., E. Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 992 (5th Cir.
1976) (“[W]hen the promisor has anticipated a particular event by specifically providing for it in
a contract, he should be relieved of liability for the occurrence of such event regardless of whether
it was foreseeable.”); Roy v. Stephen Pontiac-Cadillac, Inc., 543 A.2d 775, 778–79 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1988) (finding that seller assumed risk of contingency where seller should have known of facts
that made performance impracticable); Swift Textiles, Inc. v. Lawson, 219 S.E.2d 167, 171–72 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1975) (finding that seller assumed risk of price increase); 14 JAMES P. NEHF, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS § 74.8 (rev. ed. 2001). But see Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Can.) Ltd.,
802 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that seller did not assume risk of drought that
prevented peanut deliveries).
partial or extreme personal hazard during wartime, attempts to claim
excuse may face obstacles. Citing Transatlantic, the federal government
can argue that wartime contracts are not subject to excuse for
impracticability, because risks of war are always foreseeable for contracts
entered into during wartime.  The federal government will further respond50
that the risk of loss must have been allocated to the contractor in these
cases. Both these arguments—which together comprise the “traditional”
analysis of impracticability under § 2-615—deserve further analysis.
The government, as buyer, will argue that it did not assume the risks
relative to delivery of goods in the Middle East, a known war zone, and
that by privatizing these particular procurements the government
effectively shifted the risk to the seller under U.C.C. § 2-615.  In other51
words, KBR’s and WFS’s act of contracting for delivery of goods in
“dangerous or austere” wartime conditions eliminated their ability to later
claim excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615. Furthermore, the selling contractors
must account to the government for failure to perform.  The government52
will point out that U.C.C. § 2-615 conditions the right to excuse
performance on the seller not assuming greater obligations for
performance.  Because the government made no promises concerning the53
safety of the war zone, it will argue that the seller contracting during
wartime is always obliged to meet its contractual obligations to the
military.  In short, the government will argue that it never promised54
contractually that the delivery during wartime could be done safely—and
that KBR and WFS at least impliedly did.
12
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55. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-14.
56. See id.
57. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8.
Alternatively, the government buyer will contend that U.C.C. § 2-615
excuse is unavailable since regulations mandate inclusion of a contract
clause that addresses excusable delay.  The contractual out, if any, for55
KBR and WFS comes from the government, rather than from U.C.C.
§ 2-615, and the selling contractors must look to the contracting officer for
their sole remedy.  Although the scope of this regulation is debatable, the56
government at first seems to have a strong argument against availability
of traditional excuse doctrine for wartime sellers. The text of U.C.C.
§ 2-615 could support this position. Moreover, comment eight provides
that KBR’s and WFS’ assumption of greater obligations can be implied by
the circumstances surrounding the contract.  Under § 2-615 the parties57
have the right to make their own agreements that vary from the code
defaults. The government will therefore assert that § 2-615 excuse is not
envisioned for harsh wartime contingencies.
Perhaps more importantly, the government can point out that the
purpose of the excuse doctrine under § 2-615 does not fit the relationship
between a wartime seller and the government. Since KBR and WFS agreed
to deliver essential supplies to the military in the field, the government can
argue that wartime sellers should be required to perform. KBR and WFS
almost certainly received a higher price for the goods delivered to the
Middle East during wartime. This price increase could cover the extra
logistical and security support, higher wages for truck drivers, and even
insurance premiums to compensate contractor employees for injury and
death. In non-wartime contract situations, KBR and WFS would not likely
have needed the additional security support and may have received only
a fraction of the purchase price for wartime goods. For paying higher
prices, the government should be entitled to obtain the goods. As Judge
Skelly Wright observed in the well-known Transatlantic Financing Corp.
case that arose due to the closure of the Suez Canal:
Parties to a contract are not always able to provide for all the
possibilities of which they are aware, sometimes because they
cannot agree, often simply because they are too busy.
Moreover, that some abnormal risk was contemplated is
probative but does not necessarily establish an allocation of
the risk of the contingency which actually occurs. In this case,
for example, nationalization by Egypt of the Canal
Corporation and formation of the Suez Users Group did not
necessarily indicate that the Canal would be blocked even if
a confrontation resulted. The surrounding circumstances do
indicate, however, a willingness by Transatlantic to assume
13
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58. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 318–19 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(footnote omitted).
59. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 12.403 (addressing termination for cause of contracts for
commercial items and containing provision that the government’s rights after such termination
include all generally available remedies). Additionally, in some cases liquidated damages are
available. 48 C.F.R. § 11.501 (providing that a contracting officer should use liquidated damages
only when time of performance or delivery is crucial and when the amount of damages would be
difficult or impossible to estimate or prove).
60. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-8(f)–(g) (authorizing the government to withhold part of
payment to protect against certain losses but stipulating that excusable defaults are treated as
termination for the government’s convenience); cf. 48 C.F.R. § 352.232-9 (providing, in chapter
regulating Health & Human Services, that failure to perform may lead to withholding of payments
unless the failure was excusable).
61. 48 C.F.R. § 12.403(c)(2). 
62. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.212-4(f); U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (stating that in such instances the non-
performance is not a breach); Acme Missiles & Constr. Corp., 68-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 6,734,
A.S.B.C.A. No. 11794 (Armed Servs. Bd. of Contract Appeals, Dec. 6, 1967) (appeal) (finding
excusable delays for contractor due to operation of the government’s priorities system); Hagstrom
Constr. Co., 61-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 3,090, A.S.B.C.A. No. 5698 (Armed Servs. Bd. of Contract
Appeals, June 23, 1961) (appeal) (finding contractor not liable for damages where delay in
performance occasioned by steel shortages and governmental priorities for steel orders allocation).
63. 48 C.F.R. § 52.212-4(f), (l).
abnormal risks, and this fact should legitimately cause us to
judge the impracticability of performance by an alternative
route in stricter terms than we would were the contingency
unforeseen.58
D.  Remedies under the Traditional Analysis of Impracticability
Under the traditional analysis just described, in which neither KBR nor
WFS may be able to use the excuse doctrine, the injured government buyer
would be entitled to traditional contract remedies. Upon breach, applying
the termination-for-cause provisions of federal regulations, the
government is generally entitled to the same remedies as any other buyer
in the marketplace.  The government is also entitled to withhold payments59
to contractors absent establishment of excusable delay.  Following U.C.C.60
§ 2-712, the government’s preferred remedy is the difference between the
contract cost and the excess cost to obtain the goods from another
contractor, plus incidental and consequential damages.61
If the seller establishes excusable delay or impracticability under
U.C.C. § 2-615 exists, though, the government will not be able to collect
damages.  Instead, the government would need to pay the contractor a62
percentage of the contract price reflecting the goods already provided.63
Judge Skelly Wright responded to Transatlantic Financing’s request for
both recovery on the contract and quantum meruit relief this way:
14
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss1/3
2009] EXCUSE FOR CIVILIAN-M ILITARY CONTRACTO RS 113
64. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 320 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (citations
and footnote omitted). 
65. See 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040.
When performance of a contract is deemed impossible it is a
nullity. In the case of a charter party involving carriage of
goods, the carrier may return to an appropriate port and
unload its cargo, subject of course to required steps to
minimize damages. If the performance rendered has value,
recovery in quantum meruit for the entire performance is
proper. But here Transatlantic has collected its contract price,
and now seeks quantum meruit relief for the additional
expense of the trip around the Cape. If the contract is a
nullity, Transatlantic’s theory of relief should have been
quantum meruit for the entire trip, rather than only for the
extra expense. Transatlantic attempts to take its profit on the
contract, and then force the Government to absorb the cost of
the additional voyage. When impracticability without fault
occurs, the law seeks an equitable solution, and quantum
meruit is one of its potent devices to achieve this end. There
is no interest in casting the entire burden of commercial
disaster on one party in order to preserve the other’s profit.
Apparently the contract price in this case was advantageous
enough to deter appellant from taking a stance on damages
consistent with its theory of liability. In any event, there is no
basis for relief.64
E.  Limits on the Arguments Against Excuse
Even if one accepts the traditional analysis, there are some
circumstances in which a seller would be able to claim excuse under a
wartime contract due to war zone conditions, even where the parties
include in the contract a procedure for “excusable delay.” 
True, the newer DFARS provisions recognize that wartime contracts
involve performance in “dangerous or austere” conditions.  Yet,65
recognition that performance might be dangerous does not mean that
contractors assume the risk of any and all conceivable wartime dangers.
We might observe that even those persons who perform dangerous
contracts do not necessarily agree to perform under all types of dangers
that might present (i.e., even a firefighter is not expected to run into all
burning buildings). There are some wartime conditions where even
military personnel are held back. One would expect that performance by
civilian sellers supporting the military’s efforts would have similar
limitations. Accordingly, a court could interpret assumption of risk under
the DFARS to include only those tasks that are neither reserved to the
15
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66. If the KBR and WFS contracts were not entered into during wartime, the issue of
allocation of risk for interference due to insurgent activity would not be as likely to come up in
contract performance. The risk would most likely be neither assumed by either party nor one in
their contemplation under U.C.C. § 2-615. In such cases, KBR and WFS would seemingly be able
to excuse performance in these types of non-wartime cases.
67. See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8 (2003) (noting that force majeure clauses deviating from
U.C.C. § 2-615 should be considered in light of ‘‘mercantile sense and reason’’); NEHF, supra note
54, § 74.8 (noting that the mercantile-sense standard is often treated by courts as subjective rather
than objective).
68. See First Nationwide Bank v. Fla. Software Svcs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1537, 1542 (M.D.
Fla. 1991) (noting that good faith is an implied contractual covenant). See generally 8 CATHERINE
M.A. MCCAULIFF, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 33.4 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing good faith as restraint
on contract performance and enforcement); Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract
Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968)
(examining the concept of good faith in contract law and the impact of the U.C.C.). The contractor
has the right to appeal the determination of the contracting officer as to whether a delay is
excusable under the disputes provisions of the FAR. 48 C.F.R. § 49.402-3(g)(5).
69. 48 C.F.R. § 52.249-14 (providing that the contracting officer determines whether failure
to perform was excusable).
government nor assigned to other contractors. If the seller did not presume
that the particular wartime risks were not assumed by the seller and that
the other requirements of § 2-615 were met, KBR or WFS could delay or
excuse performance and not be liable to the government for breach.66
Given the KBR and WFS facts, it is uncertain whether a court applying the
traditional analysis would find that the contractor assumed all risks of
wartime contingencies and thereby disallow excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615.
However, if contractors assumed the risk of wartime, excuse would not
likely be available.
Alternatively, the government might not be able to disclaim
applicability of U.C.C. § 2-615 due to the inclusion of the contract
provision on excusable delay. This would be the case if the provisions on
excusable delay did not completely displace the availability of excuse
under U.C.C. § 2-615,  if the contracting officer did not properly67
determine which acts of a public enemy are excusable, or if the
government simply did not exercise the excusable-delay provision
properly as understood under U.C.C. § 2-103.  In that event, at least the68
traditional analysis of excuse would be available to KBR and WFS if the
seller did not assume greater obligations under U.C.C. § 2-615. The FAR
language appears to give the government complete authority over whether
grounds for excuse exist and what remedy is appropriate.  Following the69
traditional analysis outlined above, KBR or WFS could claim excuse and
avoid payment for failure to deliver. However, it remains uncertain
whether a court would find that the excusable-delay provisions exclude
U.C.C. § 2-615. Moreover, whether the contracting officer exercised the
16
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70. There is also some precedent, consistent with government practice regarding contracting
generally, as to the government’s ability to impose liability for delay or nonperformance on
contractors like KBR and WFS, where the performance of the contractor has failed due to the acts
of another government contractor. In Modern Home Mfg. Corp., 66-1 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 5,367,
A.S.B.C.A. No. 6523 (Armed Servs. Bd. of Contract Appeals, Feb. 4, 1966), a housing contractor
was entitled to an extension because the site had not been prepared in accordance with the
specifications by another contractor that had been hired by the government to perform this function.
Although this precedent may be implicated in some delay cases, it probably does not apply to the
facts of the representative contracts with KBR and WFS. The facts of the KBR and WFS sales do
not justify a conclusion that any failures to perform arose for any reason attributable to other
government contractors vested with responsibility over transportation safety matters in Iraq or
Afghanistan.
71. U.C.C. § 2-202.
72. U.C.C. § 1-303(b) (2001) (“A ‘course of dealing’ is a sequence of conduct concerning
previous transactions between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct.”).
73. Id. § 1-303(c) (“A ‘usage of trade’ is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be
observed with respect to the transaction in question.”).
74. Id. § 1-303(a). This subsection provides that: 
A “course of performance” is a sequence of conduct between the parties to a
particular transaction that exists if: (1) the agreement of the parties with respect
to the transaction involves repeated occasions for performance by a party; and (2)
the other party, with knowledge of the nature of the performance and opportunity
for objection to it, accepts the performance or acquiesces in it without objection.
Id.
75. U.C.C. § 2-202(1)(b) (2003).
76. U.C.C. § 1-303 cmts. 1, 8.
excuse provisions in good faith would be a fact issue. For these reasons,
the extent to which the excusable-delay provision will control arguments
of impracticability is uncertain.70
Concepts of contract interpretation can also provide a mechanism for
sellers to ease performance under a contract. U.C.C. § 2-202,  for71
example, allows parties in many cases to explain or supplement contract
terms with course of dealing,  usage of trade,  course of performance,72 73 74
and evidence of consistent additional terms.  Pursuant to § 1-303, course75
of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade all anticipate
inclusion of the concept of “commercial context” when interpreting
contract language, leaving resolution of disputes to the trier of fact and
placing the burden of proof on the party asserting the commercial
context.  Thus, although KBR’s and WFS’s contracts require delivery in76
war zones, any delay or non-performance may not necessarily entitle the
government to damages where the commercial context supports wartime
17
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77. Id. cmt. 1. But see JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS
§ 3.9 (5th ed. 2003) (noting concern with lack of uniform customs in interpretation).
78. See generally PERILLO, supra note 77 (discussing the role of meaning in interpreting the
promises of the parties).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981).
80. See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
delays due to third-party interference.  Similarly, common law generally77
provides methods for determining the intentions of contracting parties.78
Since the government regulations arguably create uncertainty in this
situation, the common law notion of interpretation against the draftsman79
may assist contractors like KBR and WFS in limiting the government’s
argument for absolute performance in all circumstances.
In sum, under the traditional analysis of the excuse doctrine, a delayed
wartime contractor has only very limited ability to successfully claim
impracticability. Unfortunately for the government and wartime
contractors, many delays and failures to perform will fall outside clear
precedent. Given the need of the contracting parties to ensure contractual
performance, it is not surprising that some courts and commentators have
grappled with alternative approaches to contractual performance. The next
Section will explore these alternative approaches to the excuse doctrine.
F.  Approaches to the Impracticability Doctrine
Several authorities present alternative approaches to the
impracticability doctrine that, while not addressing wartime contracting,
offer guidance that could be used to support its application to wartime
sellers. The most common approach applies an objective version of the
foreseeability test. A second approach builds on the objective version by
using efficiency theory to determine party intent. A third approach
suggests that more often than not, courts will apply the objective test in
light of fairness norms. Finally, this Article turns to a general critique of
any theory that, as applied, would prevent a finding of excuse for wartime
contingencies in all cases.
1.  Evaluation of Seller Excuse under the Objective Theory
If a court can find that a wartime seller like KBR or WFS has not
assumed every risk associated with wartime performance, that insurgent
attacks created a contingency, and that the insurgent activity was not
“foreseeable,” U.C.C. § 2-615 will be satisfied, thus preventing the
government buyer from claiming breach and from obtaining damages for
delay or nonperformance. Recently, the government has attempted, using
new contract language, to allocate risk to contractors deploying with the
military.  The focus of this clause, though, is aimed at personnel80
18
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss1/3
2009] EXCUSE FOR CIVILIAN-M ILITARY CONTRACTO RS 117
81. See supra notes 34, 40–41 and accompanying text. 
82. In the WFS contract, the problems with the delivery conditions were not reflected in the
contracting documents until WFS requested a modification due to the conditions. See World Fuel
Services (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of Contract § 14 (Apr. 15,
2003), http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/world_fuel_services.pdf.
83. U.C.C. § 2-615 & cmt. 1 (2003).
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981); 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (rev. ed. 1998).  
85. Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
86. Id. at 319 n.13.
management of contractors, making it questionable support for a
broad-based rule of universal contractor assumption of wartime risks,
particularly when coupled with government provisions reflecting some
policy of excuse.  Since the characterization of insurgent activity as a81
contingency may be difficult to challenge, the element of foreseeability
may have primary influence over whether a wartime seller will be
successful on a claim of excuse under the traditional analysis.
The problem, of course, is that under traditional analysis, contractors
like KBR and WFS neither expressly assumed the risk of third-party
interference by insurgents nor did the contracting parties appear to have
clearly contemplated the issue at the outset.  Moreover, the government82
buyer drafted the provisions on excusable delay and deployment with the
military. Under U.C.C. § 2-615, wartime contractors will be unsuccessful
in claiming excuse if the risk is allocated to them or the “unforeseen
supervening circumstances” were within the contemplation of the parties
at the time of contracting.  It is unlikely that the mere entering into a83
wartime contract is an implied assumption of all risks of wartime, of any
type, such as to foreclose impracticability under U.C.C. § 2-615 as a
whole. Similarly, the contracts with KBR and WFS do not include
sufficiently clear statements concerning obligations during wartime to
foreclose impracticability in the proper case, particularly since unclear
contractual language is often construed against the draftsman.  With this84
point in mind, cases of excuse may hinge on application of the
foreseeability prong of the traditional analysis.
Some judges and commentators have interpreted the general
“unforeseen” language of the U.C.C. comments as an objective test of
foreseeability to determine availability of excuse. Although the court in
Transatlantic Financing concluded that the specific vessel and crew were
able to sail around the Cape after the closure of the Suez Canal, defeating
the seller’s claim of excuse,  the court believed that an objective test85
controlled.  The court noted that it was more “reasonable” to conclude86
that the owner-operators of vessels, rather than the shippers, were in the
best position to insure against the closure of the Suez Canal, since they
were in the best position to know generally the costs that might arise from
19
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87. Id. at 319.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 319 n.13 (quoting Symposium, The Uniform Commercial Code and Contract Law:
Some Selected Problems, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 836, 887 (1957)); see also, e.g., W. L.A. Inst. for
Cancer Research v. Mayer, 366 F.2d 220, 225 & n.9 (9th Cir. 1966) (noting objective view of
excuse doctrine); Duff v. Trenton Beverage Co., 73 A.2d 578, 583 (N.J. 1950) (noting that standard
is whether parties reasonably could be assumed to have contemplated the contingency); Alamance
County Bd. of Educ. v. Bobby Murray Chevrolet, Inc., 465 S.E.2d 306, 311 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)
(“Foreseeability under § 2-615 is an objective standard; it matters not whether the seller thought
a certain event would or would not occur, but what contingencies were reasonably foreseeable at
the time the contract was made.”).
90. Transatlantic, 363 F.2d at 319 & n.13.
91. NEHF, supra note 54, § 74.8 (describing grounds for adoption of theory by courts but also
noting criticism by some commentators); see also Sheldon W. Halpern, Application of the Doctrine
of Commercial Impracticability: Searching for the ‘Wisdom of Solomon’, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1123,
1140–41 (1987) (concluding that subjective intentions of the parties is often impossible to ascertain
and describing the objective approach to impracticability); Paul L. Joskow, Commercial
Impossibility, the Uranium Market and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 119, 157–58
(1977) (appearing to suggest a test bounded by subjective and objective considerations and looking
at “[w]hat occurrences were or should have been included in the negotiations underlying the
contract and what contingencies were not”); Donald J. Smythe, Bounded Rationality, the Doctrine
of Impracticability, and the Governance of Relational Contracts, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 227,
237 (2004) (describing the objective version of the foreseeability test as consistent with the official
interpretation of the U.C.C.); Symposium, The Uniform Commercial Code and Contract Law: Some
Selected Problems, supra note 89, at 887 (“No doubt the draftsmen contemplated an objective
determination.”).
closure.  The court explained the objective test as one which should not87
excuse sellers because of less than normal capability unless both parties
were aware of the limits.  Instead, “[t]he issue of impracticability should88
no doubt be ‘an objective determination of whether the promise can
reasonably be performed rather than a subjective inquiry into the
promisor’s capability of performing as agreed.’”  The court found that the89
language of U.C.C. § 2-615 describing the parameters of excuse based on
impracticability required a showing of foreseeability judged on a
reasonable grounds, rather than the seller’s own particular ability to
perform under the contract.  Many courts have adopted this theory.90 91
Thus, when applied to KBR and WFS, the objective approach would
necessarily examine complicated commercial relations during wartime to
determine what is “reasonable” under the circumstances. For instance,
while the purchase of a computer by the government in the ordinary course
may not differ substantially from that of a large business purchasing a
computer, the context of the sale of goods delivered to an active war zone
changes the context of the parties’ relationship.
Examining the relevant practices in wartime contracting may present
additional issues. For example, twentieth-century military practice did not
heavily rely on widespread government contracts at such close proximity
20
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92. MILLER, supra note 4, at 163. 
93. Id. at 74–75.
94. Id. at 75. 
95. Id. at 75–76; see also Deborah Avant, What Are Those Contractors Doing in Iraq?,
WASH. POST, May 9, 2004, at B1 (discussing number and role of contractors and private security
forces in Iraq).
96. See, e.g., Am. Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int’l Marine Ltd., 453 F.2d 939, 944 (2d
Cir. 1972) (stressing difficulty of applying the impracticability doctrine); NEHF, supra note 54,
§ 74.8; Halpern, supra note 91, at 1142–44 (highlighting the difficulty of applying the doctrine in
a complex commercial world).
97. 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972). 
98. Id. at 944 (quoting 6 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1333 (1962)).
99. In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp. 440, 454 (E.D.
Va. 1981). The court, criticizing a more subjective approach, observed: 
Because the future is by definition unknowable, a rule holding the obligor to
performance only where he foresees, but fails to guard against, the precise event
that renders performance more difficult, would be meaningless. . . . [I]t may be
to the active war zone where a contractor would potentially need to
exercise force. Military practice, rather, focused on government control of
the use of force through military strength.  Although the United States has92
historically relied on contractors,  its practice has traditionally been more93
for support and weapons procurement at greater distances from active war
zones.  Due to the changing nature of wartime contracting,  coupled with94 95
the presence of insurgents who interfere with contract performance, it may
be difficult under the objective approach to determine which particular
risks were foreseeable to the parties and arguably allocated between them.
Because success of a claim of excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615 hinges on the
characterization of the contingency, the government buyer cannot
comfortably expect that the U.C.C. will hold wartime sellers to
performance. The parties will certainly dispute the risks associated with
extreme personal hazards compared with more ordinary hazards.
Some authorities have criticized the objective approach, which would
examine whether the parties should have contemplated wartime
contingencies.  Affirming a denial of excuse based upon impracticability96
in American Trading & Production Corp. v. Shell International Marine
Ltd.,  Judge Mulligan of the Second Circuit commented that “[m]atters97
involving impossibility or impracticability of performance of contract are
concededly vexing and difficult. One is even urged on the allocation of
such risks to pray for the ‘wisdom of Solomon.’”  Using an objective test98
to allocate all risks for wartime contingencies to the contractor may prove
unsuccessful, especially since the government recognizes in its regulations,
the civilian status of contractors and limits their use of force. Nevertheless,
the difficulty of the impracticability doctrine reflects an approach that “the
promisor should not be released from his obligation.”  This view would99
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enough that he is (or should be) aware of a certain trend, or that a given state of
affairs is in flux, or that an assumption is more than usually uncertain.
Id.; see also McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 775 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, J., concurring)
(noting that impracticability is rarely successful as a defense). But see Smythe, supra note 91, at
249–61 (arguing that impracticability doctrine improves the efficiency and productivity of
long-term contracts and suggesting guidelines). 
100. Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in
Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 89, 92 (1977); see also Daniel T. Ostas
& Frank P. Darr, Understanding Commercial Impracticability: Tempering Efficiency with
Community Fairness Norms, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 343, 357–67 (1996) (arguing for a blend of
efficiency and fairness theory).
101. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 100, at 88. But see James M. Buchanan, Good
Economics-Bad Law, 60 VA. L. REV. 483, 489–90 (1974) (criticizing the law and economics
approach for imposing contract terms to which the parties have not consented).
102. Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 100, at 108.
103. Id. at 92. Posner and Rosenfield recognize explicitly that not all cases are easy ones. Id.
104. Id. at 91 (discussing factors that determine which party is the cheaper insurer). 
encourage parties to provide for more contingencies in their contract, but
might also eliminate the seller’s right to claim excuse for wartime
contingencies—a right clearly granted in U.C.C. § 2-615.
2.  Using the Efficiency Theory to Determine Party Intent
Judge Richard Posner and Andrew Rosenfield argue that the excuse
doctrine is best considered in light of basic economic theory.  They100
suggest that courts “reduce the costs of contract negotiation by supplying
contract terms that the parties would probably have adopted explicitly had
they negotiated over” the allocation of the risk of a certain contingency.101
The primary criterion rests with a determination of which terms would
maximize the value of the exchange to the parties.  Posner and102
Rosenfield explain:
An easy case for discharge would be one where (1) the
promisor asking to be discharged could not reasonably have
prevented the event rendering his performance uneconomical,
and (2) the promisee could have insured against the
occurrence of the event at lower cost than the promisor
because the promisee (a) was in a better position to estimate
both (i) the probability of the event’s occurrence and (ii) the
magnitude of the loss if it did occur, and (b) could have self-
insured, whereas the promisor would have had to buy more
costly market insurance.103
Thus, a wartime seller would appear able to excuse performance if the
government was the “cheaper insurer” against the contingency.104
22
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105. Id. at 92–94.
106. Id. at 92.
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 93.
109. Id. at 93–94 (noting that A is the superior risk bearer particularly in situations when B
is a closely held corporation and A is a publicly held corporation).
110. Id. at 93.
111. 799 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
112. Id. at 267. 
113. Id. at 267–68.




Posner and Rosenfield apply basic economic principles to the excuse
doctrine, in an example involving a sale of custom printing machinery
from A to B.  A fire destroys B’s premises without the fault of B and puts105
it out of business.  A, left with a printing machine that does not have any106
salvage value, sues B for the price of the custom printing machinery.107
Under Posner and Rosenfield’s analysis, B will successfully argue that it
be excused from contract performance and A is not entitled to damages.108
B thus escapes liability for the price of the printing machinery because A
is the superior risk bearer.  In addition, A was in the best position to109
determine the magnitude of the loss from the machine if a fire occurred.110
In Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Carbon County Coal Co.,
Judge Posner used the economic analysis to deny excuse to a buyer who
wanted relief from its obligations to purchase coal.  The plaintiff111
Northern, who was obliged to purchase coal from the defendant Carbon
County on a fixed quantity and price basis for twenty years, later found
that it could buy electricity for less than the cost of electricity it generated
from the coal.  When Northern stopped taking coal deliveries from112
Carbon County, Northern sought a declaration that it was excused from its
purchase requirements.  Judge Posner described the excuse doctrine as113
“shifting risk to the party better able to bear it, either because he is in a
better position to prevent the risk from materializing or because he can
better reduce the disutility of the risk (as by insuring) if the risk does
occur.”  Ultimately, Judge Posner avoided the decision about which party114
was the better insurer by concluding that excuse doctrine does not apply
where parties have assigned the particular risk—and that fixed-price
contracts do just that.  Judge Posner explained that fixed-price contracts115
are explicit assignments of market risks, especially where escalation
clauses are used.  Where the buyer forecasts the market incorrectly and116
therefore finds himself locked into a disadvantageous contract, he has only
himself to blame and cannot shift the risk back to the seller.117
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118. See supra notes 9–13 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Halpern, supra note 91, at 1160–61 (noting that the judgments about the more
efficient insurer are made after a dispute has arisen and in practice “amount to little more than
conjecture”); Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 617, 626 (1983) (”[E]mploying hindsight to ascertain the efficient allocation will
be problematic in many instances.”); Ostas & Darr, supra note 100, at 352 (noting that it is difficult
to determine which party is the most efficient insurer).
120. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1651–1654 (2006).
121. Id. § 1651. For a discussion of workers’ compensation protections for contractors, see
Jeffrey L. Robb, Workers’ Compensation for Defense Contractor Employees Accompanying the
Armed Forces, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 423 (2004).
122. War Hazards Compensation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1717 (2006) (originally enacted as
Act of Dec. 2, 1942, ch. 668, § 101, 56 Stat. 1028).
123. Id. § 1704; see also Claims for Compensation under the War Hazards Compensation Act,
as Amended, 20 C.F.R. §§ 61.1 to 61.404 (outlining procedures and benefits that accrue to
claimants under Defense Base Act and War Hazards Compensation Act).
Although the court instructs how risk allocation may arise in differing
ways to preclude claims of excuse, in the end the court allows losses to fall
as they may without recognizing that the parties might not have considered
the contingency of falling prices when they entered the contract. In this
case, Judge Posner never tells us which party really was the better insurer.
KBR faced extreme hazard when it delayed delivery of goods after
intense insurgent attacks on delivery trucks.  This development might118
well give KBR grounds to invoke excuse under the efficiency theory. The
question is: Was the government or KBR the more efficient insurer?
Economic analysis of excuse cases will often falter at this step, as most
cases do not indicate which party can insure more efficiently.  Private119
parties may be completely unable to insure for many of the particular
wartime risks. For instance, the federal Defense Base Act  mandates that120
companies purchase insurance coverage for overseas workers who may be
subject to risk of injury or death.  Because of the uncertainty of121
insurability, the federal government, through the War Hazards
Compensation Act,  guarantees that the U.S. government will reimburse122
insurers for deaths or injuries resulting from combat.  If government123
contractors are unable to obtain insurance against insurgent activity, then
either the parties anticipated the contractors would self-insure (and
potentially pass the cost onto the government in terms of price) or that the
government was the most efficient insurer. The problem is not determining
that both parties assumed some risks, but, rather, drawing the line between
them for wartime contingencies. Any finding that the contractors are the
best insurers would presumably bar application of the excuse doctrine and
entitle the government buyer to damages. The difficulty in applying
efficiency theory through insurability suggests the limitations of this
analysis for resolving excuse claimed under wartime contracts.
24
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124. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT 62 (1980) (arguing that remedies for
trouble in a contractual transaction should not be open-ended); Hillman, supra note 119, at 618–19
(outlining the application of four fairness norms in the context of cessation of contract
relationships); Leon E. Trakman, Winner Take Some: Loss Sharing and Commercial
Impracticability, 69 MINN. L. REV. 471, 518–19 (1985) (suggesting different approaches to loss
allocation based on fairness principles).
125. Hillman, supra note 119, at 623; Trackman, supra note 124, at 485; see also, e.g., Sons
of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 666 A.2d 549, 560 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995) (finding that
seller’s argument’s that buyer wrongfully terminated contract failed where express contract
language allowed such a termination).
126. Hillman, supra note 119, at 629.
127. Id.
128. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 6 (2003). 
129. Hillman, supra note 119, at 618–19 (outlining four fairness norms).
130. Id. at 629–30.
131. Id. at 634.
132. Id. at 637.
133. Id. at 638.
134. Id. at 639–40.
3.  Considerations of Fairness
Some authorities have argued that fairness principles should apply to
excuse determination.  Unless the parties expressly or impliedly allocated124
the risk,  these authorities would advocate fairness as a contractual gap-125
filler.  Professor Robert Hillman suggests that “[w]hen the evidence126
concerning the parties’ intentions on cessation is inadequate or the parties
had no intentions, or when the enforceability of an express cessation clause
is uncertain, courts rely heavily on fairness in framing their decision on the
propriety of cessation.”  Comment six to § 2-615 provides support for the127
use of fairness norms referencing “the general policy of this Act to use
equitable principles in furtherance of commercial standards and good
faith.”128
Professor Hillman recommends that courts use four norms of
fairness.  First, courts should evaluate the comparative equities of the129
case, requiring a balancing of the gains and losses if the parties are held to
their agreement.  The second norm is harm avoidance whereby one130
party’s costs from the claimed excuse “greatly outweigh the prospective
losses of the other party.”  The third norm evaluates whether the party131
claiming excuse has acted reasonably and concludes that “[i]f the harm
suffered by a party was the result of that party’s own unreasonable
conduct, courts discount the harm in the balancing process.”  Finally,132
courts look to reciprocity as a measure of the benefits to the parties from
performance under the contract.  Even if a party is successful in claiming133
excuse, however, courts, when tailoring the remedy of expectancy or
reliance costs, may also take fairness into consideration.134
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135. 802 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1986).
136. Id. at 1362–63, 1365.
137. Id. at 1362.
138. Id. at 1364–65. Based on estimates from shellers, Gibbs was going to receive 52% of the
crop it had contracted to purchase. Id. at 1365. Ultimately, Alimenta was allocated 87% of the
amount it had contracted for. Id. 
139. Id. at 1365 n.6.
140. Id. at 1364.
141. Id. at 1364 n.5, 1366.
142. Id. at 1362, 1365.
143. See, e.g., Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 861 F.2d 650, 652–55 (11th Cir. 1988)
(addressing another peanut contract loss involving Alimenta where the court followed to a large
degree the first Alimenta case); Unihealth v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 623, 637–39, 638
n.22 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing the balancing proposed by Professor Hillman with approval).
An example of an impracticability case employing fairness norms is
Alimenta (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Gibbs Nathaniel (Canada) Ltd.  Alimenta, the135
buyer of a peanut crop, brought suit for breach of contract when the seller,
Gibbs, failed to deliver the 1980 peanut crop because of unprecedented
drought.  Both Gibbs and Alimenta were international dealers in136
agricultural commodities.  Using U.C.C. § 2-615, Gibbs allocated the137
peanuts available from its shellers among its customers and claimed
impracticability for the rest.  It would have cost Gibbs about $3.8 million138
to purchase other peanuts to complete its contract, whereas its profit on the
contract was $18,000 and its net worth was $2.4 million.139
Finding that the parties had not allocated the risk of crop failure, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that Gibbs was entitled to
allocate the peanuts if the drought was “not reasonably foreseeable when
the contracts were entered into and [the] performance as agreed was made
impracticable thereby.”  The court upheld the jury finding that Gibbs was140
justified in allocating the available peanuts under § 2-615 and that its
allocation was reasonable.  The court’s application of the objective141
approach to impracticability focused on the facts surrounding the
execution of the peanut contract, the circumstances of the drought, the
reasonableness of Gibbs’ response to the drought, and the effect that
enforcement of the deal would have on Gibbs.  These factors strongly142
correlate to Professor Hillman’s fairness-focused analysis of
impracticability.
The fairness approach expressed in the Alimenta analysis has
adherents.  Professor Sheldon Halpern, commenting on the risks and143
benefits of applying fairness norms, pointed out that the approach also has
its opponents:
Adjustment based on the broad exercise of equitable
powers is an intuitively appealing mechanism for dealing
with the “contractual accident.” Using this device, a court
26
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144. Halpern, supra note 91, at 1169–70 (citations and footnotes omitted).
145. Without discussing the requirements of U.C.C. § 2-615, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed that
the evidence supported excuse. Alimenta, 802 F.2d at 1364 & n.5, 1365.
146. U.C.C. § 2-615 (2003).
may “police the transaction in the interest of fairness,” and
avoid the “harsh and unjust results” that occur when courts
are forced to place the loss on one party or the other. By
substituting a “winner take some” for the “winner take all”
result inherent in the concept of “excuse,” the severe
consequences of an absolute decision for either party are
ameliorated. Loss sharing, as was done in ALCOA, rather than
allocating the entire burden to one party, facilitates a more
expansive application of the doctrines of impracticability and
frustration . . . .
To the detriment of clarity and doctrinal advancement, the
debate is conducted with loaded words: stability and
predictability pitted against fairness and flexibility. It should
be evident that we need ultimately to maximize all of these
values. The excuse complex requires balancing. To the extent
that we view the concept of contract as grounded on the terms
of the agreement, application of excuse must be limited and
judicial intervention tightly circumscribed or “the coherence
and rationality of our law of contract” is indeed threatened.
The real issues, however, are what is “our law of contract”
and to what is it referable.144
The primary criticism of the fairness approach is the lack of predictability
inherent in judicial discretion involved in its application.
The Alimenta application of fairness norms relies on the jury’s factual
finding that the party claiming excuse was simply “justified” in doing so,
which the appellate court affirmed as supported by the evidence without
discussion of the requirements of U.C.C. § 2-615.  This analysis renders145
the code provisions virtually meaningless since they can be finessed by
evidence supporting the contention that a party was justified in claiming
impracticability. Surely, the drafters did not write U.C.C. § 2-615 with the
intent that it be collapsed into a simple justification test. Rather, the
drafters clearly intended U.C.C. § 2-615 to be the basis for rules governing
excuse when “performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made.”  The risk, seen in146
Alimenta, is that courts may simply discount the code to achieve the
desired result.
If courts follow the Alimenta analysis without faithfulness to the code,
the predictability intended for sales transactions might be undermined,
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147. See Alimenta, 802 F.2d at 1363–64.
148. See Lane v. Halliburton, 529 F.3d 548, 561, 563, 567 (5th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging that
judicial inquiry into what constitutes adequate protection of convoys in Iraq and into the policy of
“employing civilian contractors in combat-suppport roles” may be barred by the political question
doctrine but remanding the case for determination whether plaintiffs could recover on tort-based
theories without the courts second-guessing the Army’s actions). The case was brought after the
April 2004 attack on civilian truck convoys in Iraq. Id. at 554–55; see also Kateryna L. Rakowsky,
Note, Military Contractors and Civil Liability: Use of the Government Contractor Defense to
Escape Allegations of Misconduct in Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 365, 366 (2006)
(discussing limitations of tort theory in wartime actions); Brett Clanton & David Ivanovich, Ruling
Revives KBR Case/Court Sees Way Lawsuits over Workers’ Deaths Could Be Resolved, HOUS.
CHRON., May 30, 2008, at Bus. 1 (noting that the families of killed and injured truck drivers are
seeking $300 million in damages).
leading parties to attempt to allocate risks of contingencies in advance,
even in the absence of reliable information. For example, the parties in
Alimenta could have expressly allocated all risks to the seller by requiring
delivery of peanuts in all circumstances, thereby foreclosing the
availability of excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615.  Since agriculture147
production and marketing involves many risks, any clause obliging the
seller to deliver in all circumstances, foreseen or unforeseen, will certainly
require imposition of a substantially higher cost on sellers. The Alimenta
case is a perfect example since the drought experienced had been
unprecedented.
Applying fairness to the KBR and WFS representative cases, even if
the contractors did not assume all risks, and even if excuse should be
precluded in at least some of the partial personal hazard cases, it is not
certain whether weighing of the relevant equities will prevent the sellers’
successful claim of excuse and allow the government to recover damages.
While Alimenta suggests that excuse is allowed after a factual weighing to
determine whether the contingency was reasonably foreseeable, any
factual showing related to the equities of the case will involve military
strategy that affected safety on the ground.  Moreover, evaluating the148
prospective losses of the parties is troublesome because it requires a court
to balance the needs of troops in the field against the safety of civilian
contractors. Similarly, inquiring into the reasonableness of the actions of
the party claiming excuse is also complicated as it may require balancing
the government’s needs for wartime supplies against the contractor’s
desire to keep delivery personnel safe. Even the reciprocity factor is
vexing where the wartime contractors are receiving a premium for
performance during wartime, but that premium may not contemplate the
full extent of wartime risks. Even if excuse is barred universally in all
wartime cases, the cost of the increased risk would surely be passed back
to the government when negotiating the cost of goods delivered to war
zones. If wartime contractors assume all risks of non-delivery, will
28
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss1/3
2009] EXCUSE FOR CIVILIAN-M ILITARY CONTRACTO RS 127
149. See, e.g., World Fuel Services (Singapore) Pte., Ltd. Amendment of
Solicitation/Modification of Contract § 14 (Apr. 15, 2003), http://projects.publicintegrity.org/docs/
wow/world_fuel_services.pdf (containing contract modifications indicating that truck drivers may
strike altogether).
150. NEHF, supra note 54, § 74.15.
151. Id.
152. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8 (2003) (citations omitted).
153. Id.
154. NEHF, supra note 54, § 74.8.
155. See, e.g., Ostas & Darr, supra note 100, at 346–50 (discussing attempts to create
workable impracticability theories); Smythe, supra note 91, at 228 (noting the trend is toward
contractors faced with harsh ground conditions be able to arrange for
delivery at any cost?149
In short, neither efficiency principles nor fairness approaches to an
objective determination of impracticability, without further refinements,
provide satisfactory guidance for evaluating claims of impracticability for
contracts during wartime, particularly for those contracts where the seller,
like KBR, faces extreme hazard.
4.  General Critique of Analysis that Would Find that Wartime Hazards
Never Constitute Excuse
Regardless of the approach for determining impracticability, contract
theory by its nature intends to hold parties to their bargains. A leading
treatise observes that when determining allocations of risk of
post-contracting events, certainty and fairness are sometimes at odds.150
Most authorities seek to avoid any injustice arising from choosing one
party over the other by finding that the risk of loss was at least impliedly
assumed by one of the parties.  U.C.C. § 2-615 recognizes that parties151
may expressly allocate risk or do so based upon the circumstances of
contracting, through trade useage and the like.  Although risks may be152
“foreshadowed” at the time of contracting resulting in allocation of risks
to one party, any allocation must be made “in the light of mercantile sense
and reason, for this section itself sets up the commercial standard for
normal and reasonable interpretation and provides a minimum beyond
which agreement may not go.”  This principle should both embrace the153
drafting of force majeure clauses and the policing of such clauses by courts
using a mercantile sense-and-reason standard.  This position avoids,154
however, the more commonplace issues of interpretation regarding risk
allocations that exist generally, and which do exist with wartime contracts
under the FAR and DFARS.
To maintain a sense of justice for unforeseen events, commentators
who discuss that U.C.C. § 2-615 allows excuse in some cases tend to
downplay its rarity.  As authorities recognize that the seller has recourse155
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expansion of the grounds on which excuse granted); Stephen G. York, Re: The Impracticability
Doctrine of the U.C.C., 29 DUQ. L. REV. 221, 229–38, 254–55 (1991) (providing critical analysis
of judicial inquiry into impracticability and stressing the importance of relational contracting). But
see McGinnis v. Cayton, 312 S.E.2d 765, 775 (W. Va. 1984) (Harshbarger, J., concurring) (“[T]he
commercial impracticability doctrine is recognized, but rarely allowed as an excuse for
nonperformance.”); E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in Contract Law During the 1980s: The
Top Ten, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 203, 213–16 (1990) (arguing that in the 1980s courts retreated
from accepting the excuse doctrine); Robert A. Hillman, The “New Conservatism” in Contract Law
and the Process of Legal Change, 40 B.C. L. REV. 879, 879–80 (1999) (noting development of rule
oriented, inflexible approach to contracts).
156. NEHF, supra note 54 (pointing to a case that found against impracticability because trail
derailments are objectively foreseeable events even though in that case the parties completely failed
to foresee its occurrence).
157. See generally id. (discussing impracticability under the U.C.C.); see also L.N. Jackson
& Co. v. Royal Norwegian Gov’t, 177 F.2d 694, 699 (2d Cir. 1949) (observing that an approach
that requires an absolute showing of unforeseebility would eliminate the doctrine altogether).
158. See supra notes 28–40 and accompanying text.
under U.C.C. § 2-615, the bulk of the discussion addresses why the
doctrine is difficult to apply. The problem lies with the foreseeability
element of the objective test whereby “a contingency is more likely to be
unforeseen by the parties yet still [be] a foreseeable risk.”  One should156
keep in mind the harsh effect of denying excuse and the ultimate result of
sellers imposing higher costs to self-insure. Application of the rule in a
way that tends to deny excuse broadly may undermine the
acknowledgment by parties that not all risks are allocated through price
adjustments, but rather that the parties expect that as a result of some
contingencies the seller should be excused.
Applying impracticability so that wartime sellers never have a right to
claim excuse even in extreme hazard cases is tantamount to carving an
exclusion to U.C.C. § 2-615 altogether. The availability of excuse is well
grounded in both U.C.C. Article 2 and general contract law, and its
availability for wartime contracts is easily justified as a matter of policy.157
The role of the U.C.C. as a gap-filler applies especially to wartime
contracts where the contracts themselves are drafted in a general sense
using the default terms of the FARS and DFARS without tackling specific
wartime contingencies. Although the risks of wartime are generally
foreseeable to the contractors and the government, not all of the specific
risks associated with Iraq, for instance, were foreseen. Otherwise, we
might expect that KBR drivers would not have been on the road in
Fallujah at all in April 2004. The government buyer is certainly capable of
understanding, and seems to understand upon reading the FARS and
DFARS provisions,  that contractors assume some, but not all, risks. By158
privatizing wartime deliveries of goods, the government buyer takes the
possibility of harsh wartime conditions into account when using civilians
to provide needed military supplies. It makes little sense to construe the
30
Florida Law Review, Vol. 61, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol61/iss1/3
2009] EXCUSE FOR CIVILIAN-M ILITARY CONTRACTO RS 129
159. See, e.g., Mark B. Baker, “A Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall”—Terrorism and Excused
Contractual Performance in a Post September 11th World, 17 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 1, 20–21 (2004)
(arguing that a strict requirement of foreseeability should not be imposed in a context where
terrorist attacks occur more often yet unpredictably); Patrick J. O’Connor, Allocating Risks of
Terrorism and Pandemic Pestilence: Force Majeure for an Unfriendly World, CONSTR. LAW., Fall
2003, at 5, 10 (suggesting that the inevitability and unpredictability of terrorism make it a classic
force majeure risk); Jennifer Sniffen, In the Wake of the Storm: Nonperformance of Contract
Obligations Resulting from a Natural Disaster, 31 NOVA L. REV. 551, 575 (2007) (noting that force
majeure clauses have become more important in light of the 2005 hurricane season).
160. RICHARD E. SPEIDEL, CONTRACTS IN CRISES: EXCUSE DOCTRINE AND RETROSPECTIVE
GOVERNMENT ACTS 3 (2007). For a discussion of terrorism generally, see INGRID DETTER DELUPIS,
THE LAW OF WAR 25 (2d ed. 2000) (defining international terrorism as “the intermittent use or
threat of force against person(s) to obtain certain political objectives of international relevance from
a third party”). But see Gabor Rona, International Law Under Fire: Interesting Times for
International Humanitarian Law: Challenges from the “War on Terror”, 27 FLETCHER F. OF
WORLD AFF. 55, 61 (2003) (arguing that terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda cannot engage in armed
U.C.C. in a way that makes excuse for impracticability unavailable in all
wartime sales when civilian sellers are limited in their ability to use force
to ensure wartime delivery of goods. Imposing damages in the extreme
hazard cases, at least, will not likely encourage sellers to make deliveries
in those situations.
There is an alternative to broad-based exclusion of excuse for wartime
contracts that is both more efficient and more consistent with basic
fairness norms. If the application of the excuse doctrine under U.C.C.
§ 2-615 needs refinement in its application—and I agree that it does, even
though there is a strong policy toward ensuring that the government
receives wartime supplies—then the sensible solution is to rethink the
approaches to the impracticability doctrine that draw the line between risks
assumed by wartime contractors and those retained by the government.
III.  USING PAST EXPERIENCE AS A GUIDE
Some commentators have argued in certain categories of cases that
excuse either is or should be available to sellers.  Although the159
commentaries help by analogy to establish some recourse for sellers
through excuse, unfortunately, none of the them establishes a proper basis
in the area of wartime contracting. What is needed is a theory that draws
the line for risk allocation between wartime contractors and the
government while remaining consistent with basic U.C.C. and contract
principles. After surveying these authorities, this Article will fashion such
a theory and explain its application to wartime contracts.
A.  Domestic Terrorism
The attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in commercial losses
estimated between $60 and $90 billion.  Although terrorist threats have160
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conflict for purposes of international law because they do not control territory).
161. Baker, supra note 159, at 21.
162. Baker, supra note 159, at 21; O’Connor, supra note 159, at 10.
163. O’Connor, supra note 159, at 10.
164. Baker, supra note 159, at 20; O’Connor, supra note 159, at 10.
165. Baker, supra note 159, at 33 (explaining that contracting parties should address risks
explicitly to avoid leaving “their positions to the whim of the courts”); O’Connor, supra note 159,
at 11.
166. No. 06 Civ. 2074 (GEL), 2007 WL 29232 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2007).
167. Id. at *1.
become more commonplace such that they could possibly be foreseen by
parties, the “frequency and predictability” are not such that parties can
respond properly in order to preclude claims of impracticability on these
grounds.  Thus, commentators adopt the position that terrorism is a161
classic force majeure event that would constitute a contingency
impracticability.  One commentary concerning the construction industry162
made the following observation:
It is this difference between the inevitability of terrorism
striking somewhere and the unpredictability—indeed, the
unlikelihood—that it will occur in a particular location at a
particular time that makes terrorism a classic force majeure
risk. A terrorist act occurring in California is not likely to
affect a construction project in North Carolina. This may not
be true, however, for all industries. The airline industry is
notoriously prone to disruption due to generalized terrorism
threats. The travel business decreases as anxiety over
terrorism increases. As a consequence, the foreseeability of
harm from terrorism to a particular airline’s business is a
much different matter than whether it is foreseeable that a
particular construction project might be affected by terrorism.
An airline might not have a force majeure defense due to a
specific terrorist event, whereas a building contractor
might.163
Moreover, even if the parties discussed the risk of terrorism generally,
they might not have thought through the consequences of a particular
terrorist attack.  Parties are advised to use a well-drafted force majeure164
clause because it is never certain how much hardship courts will require
before allowing excuse based on impracticability.165
In Travel Wizard v. Clipper Cruise Lines, domestic terrorism did not
support a claim for excuse.  On June 12, 2001, the parties entered into a166
charter contract whereby Travel Wizard agreed to lease clipper cabins for
a ten-day cruise to see the solar eclipse from waters near Australia.  After167
the attacks of September 11, 2001, the travel industry collapsed, and
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168. Id. at *1, *5.
169. Id. at *5 n.3; see also 7200 Scottsdale Rd. Gen. Partners v. Kuhn Farm Mach., Inc., 909
P.2d 408, 410 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995) (denying impracticability in case arising after the first Gulf
War).
170. Baker, supra note 159, at 33–35.
171. Id. at 12–14, 20–21.
172. Id. at 20.
173. Id. at 21.
174. Id. at 20–21.
175. Id. at 21.
176. Id. at 30. 
177. U.C.C. § 2-615(b) (2003) (“If the causes mentioned in paragraph (a) affect only a part
Travel Wizard claimed excuse due to impracticability.  Affirming the168
arbitral award in favor of Clipper, the court observed that the parties’ force
majeure clause only allowed excuse by Clipper, and that even if the clause
applied, it “would not excuse payment where performance has merely
become economically inadvisable, even if the economic conditions were
the result of a force majeure event.”169
The most complete analysis toward permitting excuse in response to a
terrorist attack is found in an article by Professor Mark Baker.  By using170
a hypothetical sale of goods by a fictitious seller whose cooking software
business in the World Trade Center is completely destroyed on
September 11, 2001, he argues that a terrorist act that destroys a party’s
place of business is just the sort of contingency that U.C.C. § 2-615
envisions.  Such events should be considered unforeseen because a strict171
reading of foreseeability undermines the doctrine.  In support of his172
argument, Professor Baker points out that terrorist attacks have “not risen
to a level at which they could be reasonably and accurately foreseen [so]
[i]t is arguably unreasonable to impose hardship on contracting parties
who have not expressly or impliedly negotiated on the subject of
terrorist attacks.”  Therefore, he argues, it is inconsistent with U.C.C.173
§ 2-615 to automatically conclude that terrorist attacks are foreseen
contingencies.174
While this argument has force, Professor Baker himself admits that it
does not resolve his case because some courts might impose a strict
foreseeablity requirement.  Additional points, furthermore, are worthy of175
consideration. First, even where courts do not impose strict foreseeability
standards on contracting parties, circumstances in some cases may indicate
that one party or the other did assume the risk. Moreover, presuming
Professor Baker is correct regarding foreseeability, he recognizes that even
where a seller’s entire inventory is destroyed, the case may be one of delay
rather than full excuse.  Third, if other sources are available, the case176
may be more properly one of allocation under U.C.C. § 2-615(b), whereby
the seller would not have a full claim to excuse.  Finally, Professor177
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of the seller’s capacity to perform, the seller must allocate production and deliveries among its
customers but may at its option include regular customers not then under contract as well as its own
requirements for further manufacture. The seller may so allocate in any manner that is fair and
reasonable.”).
178. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 4.
Baker’s hypothetical presumes a company whose entire business was
located in a building completely destroyed by a terrorist attack. The
analysis does not consider collateral damages to businesses and industries
that are not at the center of the attack, as in Travel Wizard. As a result, this
analysis does not address the more difficult questions about where to draw
the line on allowing excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615 after a terrorist attack
where the business suffers less than a full loss.
Small variations on Professor Baker’s example will illustrate this point.
Suppose that the software company involved in the terrorist attack in
Professor Baker’s hypothetical had either a key software engineer who
survived the attack and who can replicate the technology, a software
backup for the lost programs that can be customized and put into
production that is located at a facility in another state, or inventory of the
software located at a warehouse in another location. On these facts, the
seller may not be able to fully claim excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615 if, for
instance, the company is merely delayed in performance. The effect of the
variation is that the seller is able to either perform on a delayed basis or
allocate existing inventory to the buyer. The cases of total loss in Professor
Baker’s hypothetical are really only the beginning of the analysis. A
terrorist attack may not always result in seller excuse. Of course, the
further away the business is geographically from the terrorist attack, the
more likely the Travel Wizard result will actually hold the parties to
performance. The policy underlying the availability of excuse in cases
where a contingency “alters the essential nature of the performance” may
not prevail where the seller has not been devastated.178
Professor Baker fails to tackle some primary arguments against
permitting a seller to excuse performance under U.C.C. § 2-615 that might
be more helpful with the cases of wartime contractors. Once it is
recognized that the availability of excuse depends on the principles of
foreseeability and risk allocation (express or implied), the weakness of
current impracticability doctrine and the need for standards for particular
types of contingencies, like terrorism and wartime contracts, becomes
apparent. While parties generally should be held to their contracts,
Professor Baker’s terrorism hypothetical does provide a convincing
framework that would seem to warrant excuse in some cases. The
problems with extending his analysis to further terrorism events or to
wartime contracts are the unresolved issues of foreseeability and risk
allocation that are at the heart of much of the impracticability scholarship.
34
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179. See, e.g., Rodger G. Citron, Lessons from the Damages Decisions Following United
States v. Winstar Corp., 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 1, 38 (2002) (discussing Winstar in the context of
damages); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract, 1
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313 (1999) (exploring the implications of Winstar on government contracts);
John Kidwell, Commentary, Reactions to Professor Speidel’s “Contract Excuse Doctrine and
Retrospective Legislation: The Winstar Case”, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 825, 825–29 (2001) (discussing
United States v. Winstar Corp. and commentaries); Jonathan R. Macey, Winstar, Bureaucracy and
Public Choice, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 173, 190–93 (1998) (discussing specific implications of
Winstar); Richard E. Speidel, Contract Excuse Doctrine and Retrospective Legislation: The
Winstar Case, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 795, 796 (2001) (arguing the Winstar case was wrongly decided).
180. SPEIDEL, supra note 160; Speidel, supra note 179.
181. SPEIDEL, supra note 160, at 9.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 10.
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
As will be shown below, it is possible to address some of these issues with
respect to wartime contracting with a clear and coherent theoretical basis
that seems to be consistent with some of the concerns raised by
commentators on domestic terrorism. Before turning to that task, however,
it is important to take a look at another area that might add to the
resolution of wartime contracting issues.
B.  Government Acts
Most commentators who consider excuse in the context of the effect of
government acts on performance do so in the context of particular cases.179
The most comprehensive analysis of the effect of government acts is found
in Professor Richard Speidel’s writing.  He refers to the problem as180
“retrospective” government acts to describe the legal consequences of acts
that: “(1) impair certainty and stability by unsettling reasonable
expectations and investments; (2) undermine the legitimacy of a justice
system through seemingly arbitrary results; and (3) unexpectedly shift a
public burden to a specific group who did not cause the underlying
problem.”  Because it is not forseeable that the law will change,181
Professor Speidel argues that it is easier to obtain excuse in a private
contract relationship for retrospective government acts where the act
makes the contract either unenforceable or would result in direct
governmental sanctions on the performing party.182
To make his point, Professor Speidel uses the example of homeowners
who have five-year fixed-price contracts for gas supply at $3 per BTU.183
After hurricanes disrupt the gas supply, the market price of gas that the
provider, who sells at $3 per BTU, must pay to the suppliers becomes $6
per BTU.  The government, in an effort to bail out the suppliers, deletes184
the fixed-price term from the consumer contracts in the area.  Professor185
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186. Id. at 11.
187. Id.
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 158–59; see also U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (2003) (“[I]f performance as agreed has been
made impracticable by . . . compliance in good faith with any applicable foreign or domestic
governmental regulation or order . . . .”).
190. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 10.
191. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 264 cmt. a (1981).
192. SPEIDEL, supra note 160, at 260–61.
193. 518 U.S. 839 (1996) (plurality opinion).
194. Id. at 848–53, 858.
195. The contract, however, contained an express agreement to provide favorable accounting
treatment of supervisory goodwill. Id. at 864–66.
196. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183 (codified in part at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (2006)); see also Winstar, 518 U.S. at 856–58
(describing immediate and severe impact of the statute on entities that had acquired failed thrifts).
197. SPEIDEL, supra note 160, at 265.
Speidel argues that the hurricane in all likelihood did not make
performance excusable due to the fixed-price nature of the contracts.186
The supplier is excused nevertheless due to the government act.  Thus,187
the consumer must pay the higher market price for gas.188
Explaining this outcome, Professor Speidel notes that the foreseeability
factor is satisfied in the government act cases under the direct language of
U.C.C. § 2-615, leaving only the impracticability component of the test,
unless issues of risk allocation are present.  Comment ten, though,189
explains that “governmental interference cannot excuse unless it truly
‘supervenes’ in such a manner as to be beyond the seller’s assumption of
risk.”  The comments to the Second Restatement of Contracts further190
explain that parties are often aware of the risks of government regulation
and assume the risk.  Thus, private law principles should excuse191
performance in these cases.192
The leading case, which found the government was not excused by a
change in the law, is United States v. Winstar Corp.  The case involved193
a claim by Winstar that the Federal Home Loan Bank Board breached a
promise to provide a favorable regulatory environment regarding
amortization of goodwill under a regulatory contract under which Winstar
was to operate failed savings and loans.  The contract did not expressly194
address which party bore the risk in the event that Congress changed the
law,  which ultimately happened when congressional actions led to195
termination of the favorable accounting treatment given to companies like
Winstar.  Winstar brought suit for damages since it would now be196
required to meet the new accounting standards or be liquidated.197
Justice Souter observed that if the risk of the change in law was
foreseeable to the parties, then the absence of a contract provision
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198. Winstar, 518 U.S. at 905 (quoting Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P.2d 47, 50 (Cal. 1944)).
199. Id. at 906.
200. Id. at 906–07.
201. Id. at 907.
202. Id.
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 908–09 (quoting Hughes Commc’ns Galaxy, Inc. v. United States, 998 F.2d 953,
958–59 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
205. Id. at 871.
206. Id. at 880.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 880 (citations and footnotes omitted).
209. See, e.g., Kidwell, supra note 179, at 825 (“In addition to the apparent misreading of
contract doctrine that Professor Speidel highlights in his paper, the Supreme Court’s decision in the
case comes up short in terms of satisfying the law-clarification function of appellate opinions.”).
210. Speidel, supra note 179, at 817–18.
indicates that the parties assumed the risk.  The Court found that the risk198
of regulatory change was allocated to the United States because the
contract gave particular regulatory treatment to Winstar.  Since the199
agreement was made at a time when the regulatory environment was in
flux, the United States could foresee the legal changes.  Since the200
changes were foreseeable, given the contract language, the Court
concluded that the United States must have assumed the risk of regulatory
change.  This was especially true in Winstar, where the regulatory201
change would eliminate the value of the consideration received under the
contract to Winstar.  Finally, the Court concluded that the risk allocation202
prevented the United States from claiming excuse due to the regulatory
change.  Justice Souter noted that government contracts often include203
provisions whereby risk is shifted to the government.204
Justice Souter also explained that the unmistakability doctrine, which
provides that a government’s sovereign power remains unless surrendered
in “unmistakable” terms,  depends on the type of contract at issue and the205
consequences of enforcement. Justice Souter describes a spectrum of
claims that could impair sovereign authority, such as a claim for a rebate
under an agreement contemplating a tax exemption whereby the
mistakability doctrine would apply.  “Humdrum supply contracts though,206
would not be subject to the doctrine because a contract to purchase food
in the army, for instance, would not limit sovereign power.”  Justice207
Souter targets the middle where the unmistakeability doctrine will not
apply if the “contract is reasonably construed to include a risk-shifting
component that may be enforced without effectively barring the exercise
of that power.”208
The commentary evaluating Winstar expresses concern that Justice
Souter’s opinion is not fully consistent with contract doctrine.  Professor209
Speidel comments that the opinion suffers from five problems.  First, the210
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211. Id. at 817.
212. Id.




217. Id. at 818–19.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 889 (1996) (plurality opinion).
Court did not discuss important issues of procedural due process or
takings.  Second, the Court failed to distinguish between those types of211
contracts that might be subject to the unmistakability doctrine and those
beyond its scope.  Third, the Court left open issues concerning212
availability of public law defenses in regulatory contracts.  Fourth, in213
applying contract doctrine, the Court, in finding that it was foreseeable to
the United States that the laws regarding the savings and loans might
change, did not faithfully follow the well-established contract rule that
parties presume that the law will not change.  Finally, the Court214
remanded the case without instruction on damages.215
Raising an important issue for wartime contracts, Professor Speidel
expressed concern with the use of ordinary contract principles to allocate
the risk of retrospective legislation where the government premises
preferential regulatory treatment.  Professor Speidel explained that216
certain policies should guide risk allocations in government contracting
where the government retains superior bargaining power due to limited
competition among private contractors.  Risk allocation rules must be217
responsive to the type of contract and should be stated either in the
contract itself or administrative regulations.  Professor Speidel warned218
that risk allocation concerning retrospective laws should not be given over
to ordinary understandings regarding bargaining or multi-part tests based
on party assumptions.219
Professor Speidel’s argument can be extended beyond the scope of
regulatory contracts to wartime contracting. Although Justice Souter notes
the humdrum nature of basic procurement contracts,  wartime sales220
contracts in Iraq have turned out to be less than routine due to hazards
created by insurgents. The strict application of traditional doctrine must
also proceed with caution as wartime contracts arguably exhibit the same
differential in bargaining power noted by Professor Speidel. As such, the
traditional rules are as applicable to wartime contracts as they are to
regulatory ones, but one must exercise care in the allocation of risks. The
problem for wartime contracts is that the solution proposed by Professor
Speidel—a sharing of the risks by allowing excuse in response to a change
in the law, but awarding the other party reliance or restitution
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221. Speidel, supra note 179, at 821. Professor Speidel’s proposition is consistent with the
comments to the U.C.C. referring to equitable principles where finding of excuse or no excuse does
not lead to a satisfactory result. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 6 (2003).
222. Speidel, supra note 179, at 818–19.
damages—may not be readily applicable to wartime contracting.  As will221
be shown below, though, it is possible to allocate risk on a basis that
recognizes some of the concerns expressed in Professor Speidel’s writings.
This Article now turns to the search for such a basis for balancing the
needs of the government to obtain needed wartime supplies with the
contractor’s role as a civilian seller faced with various levels of wartime
hazards. It proceeds, first, by clarifying the contractual relationship
between the governmental buyer and the wartime seller and then by
proposing a method for determining whether the seller can claim excuse
due to wartime hazards.
IV.  SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF EXCUSE DURING WARTIME
In order to adapt U.C.C. § 2-615 excuse doctrine to non-routine
procurement contracts, it is necessary to determine how parties have
expressly or impliedly allocated the risks associated with wartime
performance by civilian contractors deploying with the military. As
Professor Speidel observed regarding retrospective government acts, and
equally persuasive here, “private law principles may be helpful by
analogy, [but] should not be the primary basis for risk allocation.”222
Moreover, the difficulty that the foreseeability principle adds to
impracticability analysis is heightened in contracts where parties arguably
knew that they contemplated some level of heightened risk. 
In framing a solution, we must consider the relationship of the
government, which is out-sourcing wartime functions, to civilian-military
contractors, who are typically paid a premium for wartime service, but
who are not enlisted soldiers. As such, sharing risks for purposes of U.C.C.
§ 2-615 excuse should not allocate to the contractor risks that would in
essence alter that relationship. This Article proposes that we can allocate
the risk related to inherently governmental functions to the government
because it is both what the government intends and is equitable since the
government limits the ability of the civilian contractors to defend
themselves.
A.  The Relationship Between the Government and Private Sellers:
Civilians Versus Government Personnel
Government contracting in wartime presents obvious differences that
distinguish it from routine government purchases. Cases that refuse to
allow a party to claim excuse often base their analysis in part on the
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223. See, e.g., Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 319 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
224. U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 8.
225. 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040(b)(3) (2008) (providing that contractor personnel are civilians);
see also JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND—IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN, CONTRACTING OFFICER’S GUIDE
TO SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS FOR IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN THEATER BUSINESS CLEARANCE,
DFARS DEVIATION 2007-O0010: CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AREA OF
RESPONSIBILITY 24 (2007) (providing that contractor personnel are civilians).
226. 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040(b)(3). Contractors may only use deadly force in self-defense.
Id.
227. 48 C.F.R. § 252.225-7040(b)(3)(iii); see also J. Ricou Heaton, Civilians at War:
Reexamining the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces, 57 A.F. L. REV. 155, 158
(2005) (“The law of war concerning civilians accompanying the armed forces needs to be changed
to better protect these civilians and to maintain the general distinction between combatants and
civilians unaffiliated with the military, while also acknowledging and legitimizing the fact that
civilians are so integrated into many armed forces that they have become an indispensable and
inseparable part of them.”).
228. Heaton, supra note 227, at 157.
229. Id. at 158. See also The 1907 Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
parties’ relationship to determine which party was in the best position to
insure against the particular hazard.  Similarly, the comments to U.C.C.223
§ 2-615 note that determinations of risk allocation are to be made with
reference to the “circumstances surrounding the contracting.”  Extending224
this analysis to wartime contracts, the nature of the relationship between
the government and the contractors and the particular circumstances of
wartime contracting should factor into any recommendations regarding a
framework for resolving claims of excuse.
The circumstances surrounding contracts are especially important for
determining excuse for wartime contracts. The status of the selling
contractors as civilians  is important to the allocation of the risk of225
insurgent interference with contract performance. Because of wartime
conditions, the contract between parties differs from a typical government
procurement contract. The government places restrictions on the means by
which the contractors can achieve delivery. For instance, contractors
generally may not use deadly force to secure delivery of goods.  226
Contractors that actually engage in hostilities become “combatants”
and may lose their “law of war protection” as civilians.  The law of war227
generally prohibits civilians from engaging in hostilities in order to protect
them from becoming legitimate targets for an enemy attack.  Civilians228
who break the law of war and become unlawful combatants may face
criminal liability, endanger the general civilian population, and leave the
United States in violation of the law of war under several international
conventions.  For these reasons, contractors’ civilian status is important229
to any consideration of excuse due to wartime hazards. Any rule that
40
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230. See supra text accompanying note 10.
231. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
232. See JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND—IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN, CONTRACTING OFFICER’S
GUIDE TO SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS FOR IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN THEATER BUSINESS
CLEARANCE, DFARS DEVIATION 2007-O0010: CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL IN U.S. CENTRAL
COMMAND AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY 24 (2007).
233. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
234. See supra text accompanying note 22.
would expect wartime contractors to perform in all circumstances would
necessarily fail to take into consideration the limitations on the
contractor’s ability to perform.
Thus, we should reject any argument favoring an absolute rule barring
excuse for military contractors. The argument that a contractors’ high
compensation makes wartime harm foreseeable fails to account for the
circumstances surrounding wartime contracting. Rather, the analysis
should consider the limitations placed on contractors by the military itself
due to the nature of warfare and the civilian status of contractors. Both
extremes in an excuse debate—an argument that the general foreseeability
of harsh wartime conditions should prevent a seller from excusing delivery
and a counterargument that general foreseeability should not be a barrier
to excuse—would present an incomplete analysis of the circumstances of
wartime contracting.
Consider the contracts described at the beginning of this Article, in
which the government purchased from KBR food, fuel, and other items
needed for the military in Iraq,  and purchased fuel from WFS.  Both230 231
KBR and WFS are civilian parties, as are their employees. Both KBR and
WFS might receive a premium for providing goods during wartime. Both
KBR and WFS contracts are subject to uniform governmental contracting
procedures. Government contracting regulations, though, not only
recognize the civilian status of sellers, but also limit the ability of KBR
and WFS to: (1) use force in the delivery of goods; (2) protect either
personnel or goods; or (3) engage in hostilities of any sort.232
Two separate analyses emerge. First, the 2004 attack on KBR trucks
delivering fuel presented KBR with extreme personal hazard. While KBR
personnel were able to use deadly force in response to the 2004 attack,
KBR employees were civilians and not authorized to engage in hostilities.
The ground conditions indicated that continuation of KBR deliveries after
the 2004 attack would likely trigger use-of-force issues and result in the
death or injury of KBR personnel.  Second, the security concerns, the233
damage and theft to trucks, and the threats of violence against WFS drivers
presented WFS with a case of partial personal hazard.  As such,234
performance of the WFS contract does not appear to have implicated
civilian status because there was no escalation to force issues.
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If the military itself decided not to send its own convoys to deliver
supplies to the troops or, alternatively, to use force to deliver supplies, no
one would question its authority to do so. Therefore, the fact that civilians
undertook the sale and delivery of goods during wartime may make a
difference in the excuse analysis. Thus, absent alternative facts or
contractual allocation of wartime risks by civilian contractors, there are
valid reasons for allowing the civilian status of contractor to factor into
excuse determinations.
It does not follow, however, that civilian status allows contractors to
excuse performance whenever wartime hazards are present. First,
impracticability under U.C.C. § 2-615 is subject to the assumption of
greater liability by agreement of the parties.  The surrounding235
circumstances and foreseeability of the contingency tend to go to this first
element.  Second, the civilian status of the contractors represents just part236
of the circumstances of contracting that determine which party has taken
the risk of certain wartime hazards.  Unless the risk is allocated either237
expressly or impliedly, excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615 typically also
requires a showing of impracticability.  Admittedly, the civilian status of238
the contractors is related to questions of risk allocation and, perhaps, to
impracticability. It should not be said, though, that civilian status answers
each element.
The most important aspect of the civilian status of contractors involves
the allocation of risk for wartime contingencies. Limitations on the
contractor’s ability to ensure delivery goes to the issue of whether the
government assumed certain types of wartime risks. The civilian status of
the contractors may indicate that the contract allocated to the government
some of the risks. Yet, the status does not delineate which particular risks
were in fact allocated to the government, such that the seller might
successfully claim excuse, and which risks were allocated to the
contractors. Thus, while civilian status will help elucidate the availability
of excuse in some circumstances, the status does not clearly indicate where
the line is drawn between types of risks. The problem then becomes
creating a framework for this allocation. I believe such a solution—one
that can be squared with U.C.C. § 2-615 and good contract theory—can be
obtained by looking further into the language of the FARS and DFARS
and the circumstances of wartime contracting.
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B.  A Solution Based on the Inherent Government Function
The excuse analysis under the traditional approach, which generally
requires showing that a contingency was unforeseen and that the parties
did not allocate the risk, contains wildcards implicating military policy and
political decision-making.  For example, any claim that insurgent239
activities created an extreme personal hazard might involve arguments that
the government failed to exercise its war powers to make the area safe.
Fact issues raising the political question doctrine  may leave some240
contracting parties unable to prove excuse. Both the government and
contractors alike might use military strategy as a shield against liability.
In the end, traditional excuse frameworks may be less effective when the
government’s war powers are used.
One method of proving excuse for wartime contractors under U.C.C.
§ 2-615 is to show the parties either expressly or impliedly allocated the
risk of wartime contingencies to the government.  Where the risk is241
allocated to one party, then responsibility for the contingency rests with
that party.  However, answering the question of excuse by reference to242
risk allocation dispenses with some of the more troublesome factual issues
traditional for a U.C.C. § 2-615 analysis. Further, avoiding the difficulties
inherent with the showing of “commercial senselessness of requiring
performance” is a prime reason for focusing on risk allocation under
U.C.C. § 2-615, where the contingency presented in wartime involves
extreme personal hazard to contractor personnel, rather than the traditional
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increased cost of performance in a pure monetary sense.  Yet, focusing243
on risk allocation remains true to the underlying principles of excuse
generally. This approach is in keeping with the policy of U.C.C. § 2-615
that excuse is not available when allocated either expressly or impliedly
or when the contingency is “sufficiently foreshadowed at the time of
contracting to be included among the business risks which are fairly to be
regarded as part of the dickered terms, either consciously or as a matter of
reasonable, commercial interpretation from the circumstances.”244
Moreover, focusing on the test of risk allocation may not always be
appropriate to determine excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615, such as when the
arising wartime contingency creates an impracticability for financial
reasons only. The policy of the Code indicates that “increased cost alone
does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost is due to some
unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature of the
performance.”  If a wartime seller wants to claim excuse due to increased245
costs of performance, the traditional analysis of impracticability would
seem to apply in the same way as for ordinary sale-of-goods contracts.
This last consideration is important for honoring the basic policy
underlying the Code and existing precedent. Only the issue of wartime
hazards raised by interference of third parties such as insurgents requires
special consideration.
Because there is not an exhaustive list of events supporting a claim of
excuse, a wartime seller who cannot show allocation of risk will be faced
with a fact-intensive inquiry in which the seller would have the burden of
proof.  The type of evidence required will depend on the nature of the246
particular wartime contingency alleged and may still have the potential for
raising issues of military strategy and, thereby, raise a political question,
not resolvable by courts.
Unfortunately, where allocation of wartime risks is not apparent, the
traditional approach to excuse may be fraught with limitations, difficulties,
and uncertainties for wartime sellers. The wartime seller will bear the
burden of proof regarding each element of the impracticability test.  This247
presumably will include a showing that the contingency was not
foreseeable to the parties at the time of contracting.  Like situations248
involving domestic terrorism that could possibly be foreseen by parties due
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to the greater occurrences of terrorism,  wartime contingencies are249
similarly foreseeable to parties generally, yet present challenges for
contracting parties to draft contractual language that is responsive to
possible risks. Thus, despite the possibility of wartime contingencies being
foreseeable, the parties may not have considered the consequences of
particular wartime contingencies, leaving availability of U.C.C. § 2-615
impracticability in question.
Given the problems with assessing wartime contingencies, particularly
with issues of foreseeability, it makes sense to resolve claims of wartime
excuse through allocation-of-risk analysis. Although the FAR and DFARS
do not clearly answer the question of whether the government or the sellers
assume the risks for various wartime contingencies, the regulations suggest
that both parties bear some risk. Thus, any framework governing risk must
take on two issues: first, which types of risk are assumed by the seller,
thereby preventing claims of excuse, and second, which risks remain with
the government and would support a contractor’s claim of excuse for a
covered contingency.
Determinations of risk allocation for wartime contingencies should take
into account not only the circumstance of the civilian status of contractors,
but also the difference between wartime sales and humdrum, ordinary
procurements. The circumstances of contracting indicating allocation of
risk would include consideration of the effect of the FAR and DFARS
excusable-delay provisions.  The excusable-delay provisions from the250
FAR would appear to allow contractor excuse resulting from the acts of a
public enemy.  This provision, though, must be read along with other251
government regulations because wartime contracts anticipate acts of a
public enemy. Thus, the excusable-delay provision should not necessarily
insulate a wartime seller from liability in all instances for non-delivery due
to the acts of a public enemy.
The allocation of risk for wartime contingencies would require
evaluation as to what extent the nature of wartime contracting limits the
normal excuse for acts of a public enemy under FAR. The defense
regulations on contractors deploying with the military sketch the first part
of the line between government and seller risk for wartime contingencies.
It is appropriate to allocate some risk—but not total risk—to contractors
for wartime contingencies because the DFARS recognize that:
(1) contractors deploying with the military may be performing under
“dangerous or austere conditions”; and (2) the contractor “accepts the risks
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256. Additionally, the same would arguably be true with respect to tasks that require the acts
of another contractor in the performance of a separate contract with the Government.
associated with required contract performance in such operations.”252
Taken together, these provisions begin to create a framework designed to
ensure that the government will receive needed military supplies despite
the hazards of war, and to limit the ability of wartime sellers to claim
excuse under the general FAR provisions. Therefore, based on these
provisions, the seller would have to demonstrate that the particular
wartime contingency was not one for which it accepted risk.
The determination of risk allocation for wartime contingencies
ultimately depends on the particular risks the sellers accepted under the
contract clause required by DFARS.  A strict reading of this provision253
would suggest that the sellers assumed any and all risks associated with
wartime deliveries. Such a conclusion would bar availability of excuse
under U.C.C. § 2-615 unless such an allocation stretched the minimum
requirements of “mercantile sense and reason.”  If the provision is read254
as being less than a full acceptance by contractors of the risks of wartime
hazards, then excuse doctrine would still be available. The arguments
favor the latter interpretation of the DFARS risk language.
A limited reading of the DFARS risk allocation provision is supported
by regulatory history and by the other DFARS provisions. First, the
DFARS provisions not only stress the ramifications of the civilian status
of the contractors performing during wartime, but also anticipate the
development of generalized security plans for the safety of contractors and
provide that the contractors will obtain “security services.”  These255
provisions indicate that the risks allocated to contractors would include
those that security services could protect against, as opposed to threats
requiring a military-style response.  Second, the regulatory history256
supports a limited reading of the risks allocated to wartime contractors
under the risk provision, including statements that the government retains
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the risks associated with “inherently Governmental functions.”  While257
the contractor is obliged to obtain security services for its personnel and
to supervise and train its employees regarding safety matters, the
restrictions on civilian engagement in hostilities  argue that the risks258
related to the performance of inherently governmental functions remain
with the government. Therefore, a claim of excuse by a contractor that
arises due to need for the military to exercise an inherently governmental
function should be allowable since this particular risk is allocated to the
government.
Tying the proposed risk allocation of wartime contingencies to an
evaluation of inherent governmental functions would allow a wartime
seller to claim excuse for non-delivery of goods arising from contingencies
that require response from the military. Giving the seller a narrow ground
for excuse when the seller was unable to deliver goods because contractual
performance involved duties performed by the military would represent a
balancing of the concerns of wartime contractors with the needs of the
military for supplies. The wartime seller would therefore have shown that
it is entitled to excuse, under the risk allocation provisions of U.C.C.
§ 2-615, demonstrated by the circumstances surrounding the performance
of wartime contracts.  Such an allocation would also reflect flexibility259
since the types of functions that are inherently governmental may change
over time as the government privatizes commercial tasks.  At this time,260
at a minimum, the command of military personnel and the engagement in
hostilities would be functions inherently governmental and allocated to the
military.261
The proposed procedure for evaluating excuse claims for wartime
contractors is consistent with DFARS and U.C.C. § 2-615, which
expressly contemplate looking at contract circumstances to determine
assumption of liability by contracting parties.  Of course, the facts262
supporting the inherent governmental function analysis itself may also be
subject to dispute. Yet, there is an attractive quality to a framework that
streamlines the impracticability analysis in wartime cases where
contingencies are, by nature, expected.
Returning to our representative cases for an illustration of the proposed
framework, the two cases present different types of contingencies. First,
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the case of KBR after the 2004 attack appears to present a case of extreme
personal hazard to KBR personnel vested with delivery of goods under the
contract.  The case appears to be one where KBR’s two-week delay of263
performance may be excused under this framework because safe delivery
of the fuel would probably have required engagement in hostilities. Since
engagement in hostilities is an inherently governmental function,  KBR264
would most likely have a valid ground to claim excuse. Second, the case
of WFS does not appear to present a case of extreme personal hazard of
the type in the KBR representative case.  Instead, WFS appears to have265
been presented with a case where WFS could respond by ordinary security
measures, such as careful timing of fuel deliveries during the day or
perhaps increased compensation to truck drivers facing threats and
harassment. None of these measures would seem to require a military
response. Since no inherently governmental function appears to be
implicated with the WFS case, WFS would not seem to have a valid
ground to claim excuse. Of course, even a contractor that does not initially
have a ground for excuse may face deteriorating wartime conditions that
require the exercise of an inherently governmental function at a later time.
In sum, the ability of the contractor in each of the representative cases
to claim excuse depends on whether the contingency that presents requires
a response by the military, rather than the contractor. In the former
scenario, excuse would seem to be available under U.C.C. § 2-615. In the
latter scenario where the contractor can respond to the contingency, the
contractor is expected to do so and would not be able to excuse
performance due to the perceived dangers. In other words, some wartime
risk is assumed by contractors as part of the nature of delivering goods
during war. There are, however, some risks that are beyond the response
of the selling contractors and that require military action. These cases
would justify a claim of excuse even for a contract entered into during
wartime whereby the parties must have foreseen wartime contingencies of
some sort.
Under the proposed approach, a wartime seller facing a contingency
that involves an inherently governmental function establishes a case for
excuse under U.C.C. § 2-615 by showing that the risk of the particular
contingency was retained by the government in its military capacity. To
decide otherwise would suggest that civilian contractors should deliver
goods under all contingencies and thus require the contractors to engage
in hostilities and hence lose their law-of-war protection.  At the same266
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time, the government is assured that contractors cannot rely on excuse
doctrine where the wartime hazard is such that a military response is
unnecessary. Since the contingencies involve inherently governmental
functions, there should not be a case of excuse where the military was
unaware of the contingency. The basis for excuse created under this
framework is thus narrowly tailored to fit the contractual relationship
between the government and the civilian seller. The proposed framework
that allocates risk based on whether a contingency requires exercise of an
inherently governmental function considers the need of the government to
receive military supplies, while remaining consistent with contractual
theory and U.C.C. § 2-615.
Allocating risk under the inherently governmental function approach
will yield different results depending on the contingency that the wartime
contractor faces. The KBR and WFS cases present two points on this
continuum that suggest different outcomes. Courts applying the traditional
approach, most often through the objective theory of whether a contractor
could reasonably perform the delivery, may not take into account the
nature of the allocation of responsibility for certain tasks during wartime,
a point that in turn might lead to significant differences in results.
Application of efficiency principles or fairness norms would, similarly, not
necessarily lead to a unified standard in this area. Under my proposal,
however, the seller establishing that its failure to deliver goods was the
result of a contingency that required a military response would, in most
cases, be a sufficient showing on a claim of excuse for nonperformance.
The government buyer could rebut this evidence by showing, for example,
that the contingency only required employment of routine wartime security
services or solely required a contractor’s increased cost. Even if a
contingency raising the exercise of an inherently governmental function
is argued, the government could respond that delay, rather than complete
response is justified. In any event, the government would be obliged to pay
for goods that are actually delivered, even if the goods represent less than
the full amount needed.
Of course, if the government wishes to reduce the seller’s recourse to
excuse doctrine, the issues involving the seller’s civilian status and the
law-of-war protection would be triggered. The advantage of the proposed
approach is that, in most cases, the wartime seller will be able to articulate
a case for excuse only where it involves the need for a military response
to a contingency. This rule solves the fundamental problems associated
with traditional applications of excuse doctrine, including foreseeability,
without creating a means whereby sellers can easily avoid their contractual
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obligations to deliver during wartime simply because the contract requires
performance under “dangerous or austere conditions.”  The proposed267
solution also leaves the burden of establishing the allocation of risk on the
wartime seller and should not implicate an evaluation of military strategy
that raises the political question doctrine.
The proposed procedure for establishing excuse based on the need for
the exercise of an inherently governmental function or action of another
governmental contractor should apply only to wartime contracts. Where
a party to a governmental contract otherwise claims excuse, the provisions
on excusable delay and U.C.C. § 2-615 would apply without special
considerations.  The proposed procedure for establishing excuse is based268
on the FAR, DFAR, and U.C.C. § 2-615 as written. The proposed
procedure implements the excuse doctrine under the federal regulations
and the code.  The suggested limitations on that procedure are based on269
sound policy under which a court could conclude that certain
contingencies did not involve inherently governmental functions.
C.  A Solution Based on Interpretation: Dispensing with Excuse
Doctrine Altogether for Wartime Contracts in Favor of Contract
Limitations on Delivery Obligations
Courts could arrive at the proposed procedure for establishing excuse
based on the inherently governmental function framework by using
interpretation of excusable-delay provisions from government contracts.
While an analysis based primarily on interpretation is not as
straightforward as one based on excuse doctrine, adopting the proposed
procedure on the basis of interpretation is consistent with sound policy and
code provisions.  U.C.C. § 2-202 allows parties to explain their270
agreements with course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of
trade.  An aggrieved contractor could argue that the delineation between271
inherently governmental functions and those typically performed by
contractors is such a usage of trade. Applying interpretation principles
would result in excuse of the contractor’s performance when performance
would implicate an inherently governmental function. Thus, the result
would be the same. Although the key policy arguments would match those
set forth above, a brief sketch of this alternative analysis is helpful.
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The analysis would begin with the provision on excusable delay
already part of the contracts for wartime sales, which allow excuse for acts
of a public enemy.  Because wartime contracts by their nature involve272
acts of a public enemy, it is doubtful that courts would read this provision
as allowing excuse in the event of any act of a public enemy. A court could
decide to limit this provision by interpreting it with reference to the
provisions governing the deployment of contractors with the military.273
The administrative history of the risk provisions  and the status of selling274
contractors as civilians suggests that the risk of performance relating to
deliveries of goods that require the military to perform inherently
governmental functions are not allocated to contractors. If a contingency
that arises requires the military to act, then the seller would be excused by
interpretation of the excusable-delay provisions, rather than through
excuse doctrine itself. Although this alternative analysis depends on tying
various provisions together in order to obtain the limited interpretation of
excusable delay, such an interpretation rests soundly on the same
arguments as those for the excuse doctrine. The proposed solution under
this analysis would be subject to the same limitations, as well.
V.  CONCLUSION
A wartime seller who has experienced an unexpected
contingency during wartime should not, in most cases, be able to excuse
performance. The simple reason is that the government needs military
supplies. That said, a wartime seller who has experienced a wartime
contingency involving extreme personal hazard to contractor personnel
should be able to show that delay or excuse is justified. Theories that either
bar excuse doctrine or favor excuse for all acts of a public enemy are not
consistent with the U.C.C. § 2-615. There is no basis in law or policy for
such harsh treatment of military contractors.
Furthermore, the government buyer should not be able to claim breach
of contract when a contractor faces extreme personal hazard. Some cases
and commentaries regarding the impracticability doctrine might unduly
limit the application of excuse in wartime cases by failing to take fully into
account the circumstances surrounding wartime contracting. This analysis
would run counter to the principles of both U.C.C. Article 2 and traditional
contract remedies. Cases involving domestic terrorism, in particular, run
the risk of the same failures. As Professor Speidel showed with
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retrospective governmental actions, sometimes the classic application of
contract doctrine needs revision when applied to certain types of
government contracts. As a result, the solution in the area of wartime
contracting should include methodology to adjust contractual relations to
the nature of wartime contracting.
This Article proposes such a solution. The proposed solution
recognizes that there are some cases where a government buyer should not
be able to obtain damages for breach of contract after a contractor fails to
deliver or is delayed in doing so. U.C.C. § 2-615 already makes excuse
available to parties who meet its requirements. Thus, the proposed solution
is firmly grounded in the U.C.C. and contract theory generally. The focus
of the solution is identifying how the parties have allocated the risk of the
occurrence of different wartime contingencies so that courts and the parties
will know when excuse is appropriate. As U.C.C. § 2-615 already
recognizes that parties may allocate the risk of contingencies, either
expressly or impliedly, the proposed solution does not require any change
in the law.
Unlike the application of the classic three-pronged approach to
impracticability, however, the proposed procedure for excuse focuses on
a determination of whether the parties have allocated the risk of loss of a
certain wartime contingency to the contractor because the contingency
does not involve a response requiring exercise of an inherently
governmental function. For example, after the 2004 attack, KBR would
appear to be justified in delaying performance because the wartime
contingency required a military response. Alternatively, WFS would not
seem to present a case of excuse because the wartime contingency
appeared to be one that WFS could respond by hiring security services,
altering delivery schedules, and the like. Each of the representative cases
leads to a different outcome due to the application of the risk allocation
that places risk of certain wartime contingencies on the contractors in
cases where a military response is not needed. These cases highlight the
merits of the risk-allocation methodology proposed in this Article.
In short, while traditional impracticability analysis offers less clarity
when applied to wartime contracts for the sale of goods, current law
supports the application of a risk-allocation method of excuse
determination. Judges and parties can determine whether the contingency
underlying the claimed excuse implicated an inherently governmental
function—that is, a military response, rather than a civilian one. This
procedure for allocating the risk of a wartime contingency is merely a
method for making out a case for excuse by recourse to established statutes
and regulations on inherently governmental functions. This methodology
is also available by the alternative grounds of interpretation of required
contract language for wartime contracts.
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